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Information Lost and Found
Frederic M. Bloom*
At the core of every lawsuit is a mix of information-revealing
documents that chronicle a party's malfeasance, guarded memos that
outline a lawyer's trial strategy, fading memories that recall a jury's
key mistakes. Yet the law's system for managing that information is
still poorly understood. This Article makes new and better sense of
that system. It begins with an original examination of five pieces of
our civil information architecture-evidence tampering rules,
automatic disclosure requirements, work product doctrine,
peremptory challenge law, and bans on juror testimony-and
compiles a novel study of how those doctrines intersect and overlap.
It then fits these five doctrines into a creative rule typology, one built
on the frame of "(in)valid (mis)information. " This typology charts
our system's most basic commitments-to accuracy, to
adversarialism, and to procedural equality. But it also raises a
critical question about the space between what our rules now require
and what legal actors actually do. To help answer that question, this
Article reaches out to an untapped social-science discipline: the rich
and instructive field of Information Behavior (IB). This Article uses
1B to shed new light on how our information rules function and where
they still may fail. It also offers fresh and focused insight on the
nature of information in civil litigation-from before a lawsuit opens
until well after it ends.
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INTRODUCTION
Information defines litigati6n. 'No less than judge or jury, counsel or
claim, information drives legal strategy and determines outcomes. Defenses
cave at the sight of a critical document. Cases crumble for want of a key fact.
The story of any case, then, is the story of its information-some shared, some
hidden, some lost, and some found.
This Article is about that information. It studies those clashes and
compromises so peculiar to our system of information antagonism'-the
competition condoned, the cooperation compelled, the sanctions threatened, the
blind eyes turned. And it argues for a new way to understand how that system
now works-first by paying fresh attention to how our rules fit together, then
by introducing something useful outside the law. My goal is not some grand but
impossible project of unification, some quixotic attempt to distill all of
"evidentiary process ' 2  into an essence clean and clear. Our information
architecture was messy before-perhaps for good reason-and so it shall stay.
But this Article argues that our information architecture can, and should, be
1. By information antagonism, I mean the kind of structured, information-based adversarialism
so central to modem civil adjudication. See ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FIss, THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE 190 (1979) ("Any situation of structured antagonism creates the proper conditions for
strategic behavior ... ").
2. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57
STAN. L. REV. 291, 293 n.9 (2004) (defining evidentiary process as "a hybrid field of law concerning
the manner in which the legal system itself processes information").
INFORMATION LOST AND FOUND
better understood. It defines litigation by disparate demands and divergent
rules. And it does so, in some way, before a case, during it, and after it too.
So think, to start, of three moments. The first arrives early. It comes
before a complaint has been filed, though not before a dispute has emerged. A
large corporation (let us say) has heard hints of an impending lawsuit, troubling
whispers that a former employee, only recently fired, will soon sue for sexual
harassment. A full folder of company email chronicles the corporation's
malfeasance-the lewd advances by supervisors, the detailed warnings ignored
by managers, the clumsy scheme to punish the accuser-and the corporation
knows it. It knows too that it would prefer to destroy this email folder, quickly
and quietly, as cunning (if not commendable) counsel might advise. 3 But this
folder is information that the corporation must instead preserve and protect,
though not also publicize.4
A second moment comes later. It arrives soon after a case has formally
started, this one in federal civil court. A careful attomey has prepared her side
of that case meticulously. She has enlisted a parade of friendly witnesses,
gathered stacks of useful physical evidence, and assembled reams of nuanced
damage calculations-all at her client's expense. She would like, too, to keep
these things hidden from her adversary, at least for a time. All the better, she
may think, to discourage rival free riding, to exploit her hard-won
informational advantage, and to facilitate strategic surprise.5 But this work is
information that the attorney must disclose to her opponent immediately-all of
it, without court order.
6
And a third moment comes later still. It arrives after trial has ended and a
jury verdict has been entered. A member of that jury has revealed something
damning about deliberations: he has reported-to friends, to press, to anyone
who might listen-that the jury decided against the plaintiff, not because her
suit was wanting, but because they misunderstood the law. Had the jury known
what sexual harassment law actually required, he feels sure they would have
voted differently. Now the plaintiff, understandably, would like to pursue this
3. See Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary
System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 315-16
(1991) ("[T]he lawyer certainly may, and arguably must, provide her clients with complete and
accurate advice, even when she reasonably believes that doing so will cause them to withhold or
suppress evidence."); Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1288
(1975) ("Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure that truth is ascertained
but to advance his client's cause by any ethical means."); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex
Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 528 (2010)
("[E]videntiary motivation will often undermine substantive law's efforts to minimize harm at the
lowest possible cost.").
4. See generally JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (1995) (discussing
spoliation and the evidence-preserving responsibilities of parties).
5. See, e.g., Sanchirico, supra note 2, at 337 ("[O]ur system still thrives on catching witnesses
offguard.").
6. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298-99 (1978).
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revelation. It implies, after all, that only a conceded and correctible jury error
kept her from relief. But this revelation is information that the plaintiff can hear
but not use-and the court must ignore it too.
7
Alone, unconnected, these moments are useful snapshots. Each sketches a
kind of information conflict-between access and self-interest, cooperation and
competition, accuracy and finality. And each records a rule-based resolution:
The corporation must safeguard access to the very information that may later
doom it. The careful attorney must cooperate with the very opponent she aims
to defeat. And the loose-lipped juror must accept the finality of a verdict he
now thinks so wrong.
But together, in concert, these moments do more than only that. They
trace the long legal plot of a workplace tort and its failure at trial. And they
track an information architecture built of inevitable tensions and essential
tradeoffs: The corporation is reprehensible enough to have tolerated sexual
harassment-but still responsible enough not to suppress harmful evidence.
8
The careful attorney is partisan enough to pursue victory-but still impartial
enough not to subvert the search for truth. 9 And the loose-lipped juror is
authoritative enough to render a verdict-but still irrelevant enough, right after,
to ignore in court. 10
One goal of this Article is to tie these tensions and tradeoffs together. It
aims to explore a set of seemingly disparate "information rules"-about
evidence tampering, automatic disclosure, work product doctrine, peremptory
challenges, and juror testimony-and then to tease out lasting lessons from
close comparison. Others have studied these rules in doctrinal isolation. They
have refrained bans on evidence tampering as a kind of "tax" on primary
conduct," defined automatic disclosure as a sort of noble duty,12 argued for the
abolition of work product doctrine,' 3 urged the elimination of peremptory
challenges, 14 and listed reasons to pry open the jury's black box. 15 This Article
7. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
8. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 325-26.
9. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 332 (2003);
Brazil, supra note 6, at 1311 ("[T]he business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible
without violating the law.").
10. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 580, 697-708
(1997) ("The jury's secrecy is an aid to legitimacy, for the privacy of the jury box shrouds the
shortcomings of its methods.").
11. See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1316 (2004)
(discussing how evidence tampering rules may influence behavior outside of court). To be fair,
Professor Sanchirico's lens is significantly (and consistently) wider than most. See id at 1227. In many
ways, in fact, his "integrated approach" both encourages and foreshadows mine. See id
12. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 1349; William W. Schwarzer, In Defense of "Automatic
Disclosure in Discovery," 27 GA. L. REV. 655 (1993).
13. See Elizabeth Thomburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1991)
("[W]ork product [doctrine] should be eliminated entirely.").
14. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810 (1997).
[Vol. 100:635
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aims to do something different, something broader and more integrative. It
hopes to show how these rules, so long uncompared and uncoupled, might
influence each other-how rules requiring disclosure of favorable information,
for example, might mitigate work product doctrine's secretive bite. It hopes too
to highlight how these rules, linked together, might mediate a range of
conflicting policy impulses-how the corporation's and the careful attorney's
forced preverdict openness, for example, might balance the juror's compelled
postverdict silence. 16 And it hopes to chart a more careful way forward,
sketching a map for legal progress within a delicate information ecology.
Another goal of this Article is to tie these rules to something instructive
outside the law. It reaches out to the growing field of Information Behavior, a
rich body of research and theory devoted to making sense of "how people need,
seek, give and use information in different contexts." 17 Information Behavior is
to date unexamined in legal scholarship and uncited by courts." But
Information Behavior may shed useful light on how the law's "information
rules" fit as well as how they function-how spoliation rules offset our worst
information instincts, for example, and how automatic disclosure pits legal self-
interest against itself. It may also help answer the very questions raised by the
corporation, the careful attorney, and the loose-lipped juror too: When does
legitimacy require more information and when less? Should it matter if the
information holder is an impartial fact finder or a self-interested foe? How is
unwanted information best avoided? And how is undesirable information
conduct best controlled? This Article thus takes an initial look at Information
15. See, e.g., Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule
and the Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 57,59 (1993).
16. My hope is to frame a "more fruitful, contextual approach to the tradeoffs between truth
and other values" by assessing "the changing objectives to which various kinds of [rules] are devoted."
Mirian Damagka, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 302 (1998). A few others have
embraced this cross-doctrinal approach, none more stylishly than Professor Alschuler. See Albert W.
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989).
17. Karen E. Fisher et al., Preface to THEORIES OF INFORMATION BEHAVIOR, at xix, xix
(Karen E. Fisher et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter THEORIES]; see also NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN
INFORMATION BEHAVIOR (Amanda Spink & Charles Cole eds., 2006) (compiling recent 113
scholarship).
18. My claim here warrants two qualifications. First, the conversation has not been quiet in
both directions: Information Behavior ([13) scholarship has been more attentive to lawyers than legal
scholarship has been to 1B. In bits and pieces, in fact, 1B scholars have been studying the conduct of
lawyers since the early 1990s. See DONALD 0. CASE, LOOKING FOR INFORMATION: A SURVEY OF
RESEARCH ON INFORMATION SEEKING, NEEDS, AND BEHAVIOR 278-80 (2d ed. 2007). Second, legal
scholarship is not entirely IB-oblivious: though IB itself has gone generally unconsidered, important
legal scholars have drawn much from sometimes-parallel fields. See, e.g., Dan Simon, A Third View of
the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decisionmaking, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004). I draw
heavily on this legal work in the pages below.
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Behavior, not as an exclusive basis for legal reform, but as an appeal for
engaged exploration and a source of novel insight. 
1 9
Neither insight nor exploration is particularly valuable, of course, with too
scattered a focus. So a few issues of scope and subject should be addressed at
the outset. To start, it is important to stress that this Article concentrates on
information rules of a civil, not criminal, type. Some of the rules I examine
(like the ban on juror testimony) shape criminal litigation as much as civil, and
I will incorporate lessons learned from criminal doctrine when most pertinent.
But some rules (like symmetrical mandatory disclosure) are entirely civil, while
others (like Miranda0 and Brady2 1) are criminal alone. So though criminal and
civil procedure still have "a lot in common, ' 22 civil information rules make up
a curious architecture all their own. This Article focuses there.
If that focus is in some ways narrow, however, this Article's definition of
"information" is markedly not. And so it is important, too, to underscore the
definition of "information" I use: Information is not just that evidence of fact or
opinion presented at trial-though it is certainly that. It is also (as the three
moments above hinted) what parties have and hide, what lawyers think and do,
and what jurors signal and say. It is, to adapt one common description, any bit
of data or knowledge that might make a difference in litigation. 23 By definition,
then, many civil rules are "information rules"-from those written into formal
codes of evidence and procedure to those found in the murky comers of
19. See Richard D. Friedman, 'E " is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA.
L. REv. 2029, 2029 (2001) (identifying the "need for an eclectic approach to evidentiary problems");
cf David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: Wat Civil
Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 686 (2006) (calling for
"more cross-comparison between American civil and criminal process").
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
22. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 684; cf Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
384 (2004) ("The need for information for use in civil cases, while far from negligible, does not share
the urgency or significance of the criminal subpoena .... ).
23. See GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT:
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 281 (1999) ("Information ... is about differences that
make a difference."); see also EJAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 108 (1982)
("The term information ... is used here in a very general sense. The distinction sometimes made
between 'data,' 'information' and 'knowledge' has no useful consequence for the discussion at
hand."). Recent studies of "information privacy" seem to define "information" along similarly
expansive lines. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1205-08 (1998) (separating "personal" from "non-personal" information); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (2006) (discussing "information collection,"
"information processing," and "information dissemination"). While there is much to admire in this
"information privacy" literature, I engage it only at points here. I do not try to chronicle the
"breathtaking rise of the Information Age" or the bulky weight of our "informational baggage."
Solove, supra, at 483, 513. Nor do I try to unlock the secrets of cyberspace's "political, economic, and
social impact." Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1132 (2000). I try instead to shed
new light on how our civil system manages and manipulates information pertinent to particular cases.
And so I stray only rarely from litigation's long shadow.
[Vol. 100:635
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common law. And by definition, too, their linked examination is all the more
timely and appropriate.
This Article divides that examination into three parts. Part I studies five
information rules-those, again, about evidence tampering, automatic
disclosure, work product doctrine, peremptory challenges, and juror testimony.
Much of this review is doctrine specific. It inspects the conflicts, concessions,
and chronologies particular to each doctrine individually. Even as it does,
however, Part I hints at areas of overlap and interplay-places where prefiling
rules about access and accuracy, say, inform postfiling rules about fairness and
finality. It also suggests a need to think differently about information rules
overall-how they interact, how they map together, and how they call for novel
typologies.
Part II begins that rethinking. It starts by making more explicit those
comparative and still speculative lessons implied in Part I. Some of those
lessons capture particular doctrinal connections-like the link between
evidence tampering's commitment to front-end access and juror testimony's
endorsement of back-end concealment. Others suggest a more general
information ambivalence, a kind of interrule anxiety about the fluid demands of
adjudicative accuracy, 24 civil adversarialism, 25 and procedural equality.26 Part
II uses these different measures to map and remap the five information rules
discussed in Part I, illustrating their quiet collaborations, their important
counterbalances, and their assorted contributions to litigation legitimacy. 27 It
then fits these rules into a new and hopefully illuminating information
typology, one built of four basic categories: valid information, invalid
information, valid misinformation, and invalid misinformation. These four
categories help connect, even synthesize, a range of disparate commitments-
to accuracy, to adversarialism, and to procedural equality. But they raise an
urgent question too: Are our information rules well tailored to what legal actors
actually do?
Part III provides an initial answer. It introduces the research, theory, and
still modest empirical work of Information Behavior-what information
behaviorists often call "IB." 28 The goal of Part III is self-consciously
exploratory and intentionally provisional. It does not purport to summarize
24. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031,
1032 (1975) ("[O]ur adversary system rates truth too low ... ").
25. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV.
1903, 1914 (1993) ("[T]he problem of deceptive evidence gathering in civil litigation is essentially a
lawyers' problem."), Friendly, supra note 3, at 1288.
26. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1865 (2002).
27. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787
(2005).
28. See, e.g., CASE, supra note 18, at 278 ("[T]here is little known empirically of the
information seeking behavior of attorneys.").
2012]
CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW
every subtle facet of IB scholarship. Nor does it aim to smuggle in normative
preferences in the guise of initial inquiry. It means instead to show how
particular information rules do (and do not) abide central IB tenets-how the
bar on juror testimony, for example, follows the lesson that "avoiding
information is at times a rational strategy." 29 It aims to identify core IB
principles-like the idea that information seekers expend the least possible
effort, 30 or the notion that people overestimate the value of what they know 
31-
and then to ask how these principles comport with the law's information
design. And it hopes to tender both a pessimistic caution and an optimistic call:
the caution is to remember that litigation's central players-whether parties,
attorneys, jurors, judges, or witnesses-are likely prone to some of IB's most
serious errors. They misread information simply because it lacks context, reject
data simply because it is disagreeable, and struggle to imagine what new
information might reveal.32 But the call is to see how our information rules, as
a group, already work to temper these errors-and to ask how those rules may
do better still.
Some of that improvement will require little change. And so I will
argue-for reasons of adversarial balance and common information instincts-
that spoliation enforcement should be strengthened and automatic disclosure
preserved. But some of that improvement will demand more dramatic
measures. And so I will argue that peremptory challenges should, in civil cases,
at long last be let go.
A short conclusion then brings this Article to a close. It reiterates two
crucial but unchronicled connections-one between various information rules,
the other between law and Information Behavior. It recalls the typology that
links these connections together. It looks briefly at other information rules,
some civil and some not. It suggests additional places where IB and law might
profit from deeper engagement. And it reminds that the integrated study of
legal information is as essential as it is now overdue. For information defines
litigation from start to finish-whether shared or hidden, lost or found.
I.
THE PIECES
Information antagonism is both old and new. Its roots reach back
centuries-to an adversarial process forged in the London courts of Old Bailey
29. 1d. at 327.
30. See GEORGE KINGSLEY ZIPF, HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT:
AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN ECOLOGY, at ix (1 st ed. 1949).
3 1. See Marcia J. Bates, An Introduction to Metatheories, Theories, and Models, in THEORIES,
supra note 17, at 5. 1 discuss the sources of related and more familiar insights--particularly those from
cognitive psychology and behavioral law and economics-at some length below. See infra Part IIH.
32. CASE, supra note 18, at 98-99, 327; see also Sanchirico, supra note 2, at 364 ("[R]ecasting
cognitive limits as instruments, rather than obstacles, brings to the fore central aspects of system design
that have languished largely unnoticed in the gray background of evidentiary process.").
[Vol. 100:635
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and the Treason Trials Act of 1696. 33 There, in summary session papers and
parliamentary decrees, lie the outlines of a now-familiar form: partisan lawyers
charged with finding and framing evidence for trial, passive judges conducting
no investigation of their own. 34 Yet that form is still distinctly modem, shaped
by the quirks of advanced technology 
35 and the demands of "restyled" rules.
36
This Part looks at five features of that modem image. It examines
evidence tampering (or spoliation), automatic disclosure, work product
doctrine, peremptory challenges, and juror testimony-all with a focus on how
they operate now. Neither this Part nor this Article pretends to inspect each and
every information rule. My goal, instead, is to take a methodologically eclectic
first step, using a formally and chronologically diverse sample to expose and
explore new questions of rule interaction, adjudicative policy, and information
theory. Part L.A begins this process with a careful, if condensed, doctrinal
review. Part I.B then documents how these rules might work in a single
(stylized) case, previewing where these rules interact as sources of conflict and
as spaces of coordination.
A preliminary note about selection: my choices here aim to be useful, not
in spite of their counterintuitive flavor, but precisely because of it. By pairing
and comparing seemingly disparate rules, I hope to make my arguments sharper
and more penetrating, not merely unexpected and provocative. It may seem
strange, of course, to concentrate on any specific batch of rules when
advocating integrated analysis. No part, it may seem, can ever entirely explain
the whole. But the rules I examine represent a diverse sample-in form and
function, in timing and rationale-and so they illustrate many core
characteristics of our system overall. Even more, these rules present our
system's commitments in often-stark relief, and so their (counter)balances can
be most striking. 37 It makes some sense, then, to begin with them.
33. See LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 3, 181. My history is a touch speculative here. Professor
Langbein's canonical study, from which I draw much support, concentrates on criminal, not civil,
procedure-and the two are not identical. Id. at 7. But at least in terms of adjudicative practice, my
anchor seems entirely secure. "[T]he basics," Langbein tells us, "are not in doubt": our adversarial
system grows out of particular English soil, and the "model came from the civil side." Id. at 8.
34. Id. at 1-3, 7-9, 212. See id. at 180-90 (discussing the deficits of the Session Papers).
35. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889 (2009).
36. To be clear, the restyling was not meant to alter the operation of the Federal Rules. It
promised only aesthetic, not substantive, legal change. See Memorandum from Hon. David F. Levi,
Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory
Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV 12-2006.pdf.
37. I acknowledge that other doctrines may inform some of those balances, perhaps quite
substantially. My prescriptions in Part II are thus deliberately tentative. Cf Alschuler, supra note 16,
at 154 (arguing that our current approach to juries "capture[s] the worst of two worlds"). But one aim
of this project is to show precisely what this quandary of selection indicates-that information rules
are deeply interconnected, a kind of tightly-knotted legal web. And another is to prove my choices





Spoliation is a kind of cheating. 38 It is the act of suppressing, altering, or
destroying information pertinent to pending or impending litigation-and it
often leaves no trace. 39 Those who may benefit from particular information
might not know of its existence. So those inclined to tamper may think they can
cheat without consequence. It is easy to imagine why they would try.
How often they try is a matter of some dispute. Some claim that evidence
tampering is rampant, an "epidemic" taking various noxious forms-from
scrubbed computer files to outright perjury.40 Others question this account of
unbridled abuse, noting that relevant empirical studies are both inconclusive
and thin.4 1 Still, no one argues that our system is "'drowning' in litigant
integrity. ' ' 42 And no one doubts that evidence tampering is a serious concern.
Courts are not oblivious to the problem. They know that parties have
ample reason to tamper with unfavorable information-to inflict "evidential
damage,, 43 that is, in a way that improves their adversarial position and
impedes the "search for truth." 4 So almost three centuries ago an English court
proposed a solution: it would discipline the spoliator.45 Litigants caught
breaching their duty to preserve evidence would be held accountable in court.
Since then, both courts and scholars have tried to determine precisely
how. One option, and the choice of that first English tribunal, is to presume "all
38. See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1992).
39. Id; see also MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE:
SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (Daniel F.
Gourash ed., 2d ed. 2006) ("Absent notice of litigation, or another source of duty to preserve evidence,
a company or individual generally has the right to dispose of his own property ...."). A note about
usage: my definition of "spoliation" is both modest and conventional. It does not include things like
"unfair and inadequate disclosure prior to trial"-a related but importantly different thing. Sanchirico,
supra note 11, at 1232 n.63.
40. See Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1219; see also Dale A. Oesterle, A Private Litigant's
Remedies for an Opponent's Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV.
1185, 1185 (1983); Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems andAbuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 829 ("[It is] difficult to exaggerate
the pervasiveness of evasive practices.").
41. See Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1231 ("[F]or a phenomenon that everyone seems to think
happens all the time, tampering remains surprisingly elusive in systematic empirical analysis."); id. at
1231-34 (recounting the roundabout tale of"S. Pepke," putative author of a definitive empirical study
of evidence tampering); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396
(1994) (doubting empirical evidence of "alleged massive discovery abuse in the federal courts").
42. Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1247.
43. Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1901 (1997).
44. Nesson, supra note 38, at 793; see Frankel, supra note 24, at 1041.
45. From the Latin contra spoliatorem omniapraesumuntur. KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note
39, at ix.
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things" against the spoliator-to require, that is, a negative inference against
the tampering party. 46 A second is to permit a separate (tort-like) claim against
the spoliator. 47 And a third is to fashion a new, spoliation-specific rule of
procedure-or at least to encourage judges to make better use of the
antitampering tools they have.
48
Each of these approaches has its problems. A negative inference, for one,
is scarcely punishment at all. It leaves the spoliator in no worse a position than
if he had dutifully preserved and produced the evidence-a position hardly
uncomfortable enough to dissuade Holmes's instrumental "bad man." 49 A
separate claim, in turn, may carry more costs than benefits. It presents "patently
impracticable" damage assessments, promises the wholesale "replaying or
rehearsing" of the underlying lawsuit, 50 and provides even greater reason for
cynical parties to "suppress and settle.",51 And procedural rules, whether new or
old, may fail to deter cheaters in a world of weak-kneed courts. Most civil
sanction rules-like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37-are already potent in
theory, permitting judges to punish those who spoliate and to dismiss or default
cases tainted by tampering. But these rules are often toothless in practice,
applied by courts in ways that minimize spoliation problems-or avoid them
outright.
52
Not that "victims" of spoliation are entirely without hope of redress.
53
Federal courts do discipline spoliators-sometimes through negative inference
jury instructions, occasionally by default or dismissal, but never through
separate legal action.54 Yet federal courts will impose no sanction at all unless
46. Id. at 63 ("Under this inference, the jury is instructed that it may assume that the lost
evidence, if available, would have been unfavorable to the spoliator."). For a helpful summary of the
adverse inference process, see Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1998) ("In
order for an adverse inference to arise from the destruction of evidence, the party having control over
the evidence must have had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed .... Once a court
has concluded that a party was under an obligation to preserve the evidence that it destroyed, it must
then consider whether the evidence was intentionally destroyed, and the likely contents of that
evidence.").
47. Porat & Stein, supra note 43, at 1895.
48. Sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g) and 37, referrals to the Bar, and
statutes criminalizing the obstruction of justice all purport to combat evidence tampering already. See
Nesson, supra note 38, at 794 ("Judges have a wealth of tools with which to punish spoliation ....");
id. at 806 ("Existing rules are more than adequate.... But... judges are extremely reluctant... to
punish discovery violations once exposed .... ).
49. Id. at 797, 805-06; Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1277. And the "bad man" would seem
least dissuaded when dissuasion matters most. Perhaps a negative inference could discourage a cynical
actor from spoliating otherwise insignificant evidence-duplicate documents, say, or anodyne reports.
But that inference may do little to dissuade the destruction of something far worse-a unique and
damning physical object, perhaps, or a "smoking gun" email.
50. Porat & Stein, supra note 43, at 1912-13.
51. Nesson, supra note 38, at 796.
52. Id. at 806.
53. See Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1301 n.354.
54. KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 39, at 257-58.
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the spoliator had prior notice of the pending or impending action and of the
spoliated information's relevance. 55 Nor will they readily reopen final
judgments, even when spoliated evidence belatedly appears.
56
There may be a reason for this reticence. It may reflect a concem about
judicial dockets, a sense that vigorous punishment of evidence tampering will
encourage more spoliation accusations-and, in time, overwhelm the courts.
57
Or it may imply a judicial focus, not solely on truth in adjudication, but on
carefully calibrated incentives for "primary activity. ' 58 Yet truth remains at the
hopeful heart of spoliation doctrine. It aims to preserve information so that
litigation outcomes are more truthful and more accurate. And like automatic
civil disclosure, it attempts to force adversaries to cooperate rather than
compete-if only at the start.
2. Automatic Disclosure
Automatic civil disclosure is relatively new to federal court. It first took
hold there in 1993, when an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
initially required parties to share particular types of information without court
order or request. 59 And it reached its current form even more recently, when an
Advisory Committee "restyled" the Federal Rules.
Today's Rule 26 obliges federal civil parties to disclose four things
automatically: the name of any individual "likely to have discoverable
information.., that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment"; a copy or
description of all "documents, electronically stored information, and tangible
things" that the disclosing party possesses or controls and "may use to support
its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment"; a
computation of damages with related materials; and a copy of any insurance
agreement pertinent to the dispute.
60
Prior versions of the rule required more. They demanded that parties
divulge, not just information that would "support" their claims or defenses, but
55. See id at 258 (discussing these limits in the context of adverse inferences).
56. "IT]he risk from disclosure of previously suppressed evidence," Professor Nesson explains,
"diminishes rapidly." Nesson, supra note 38, at 798. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 gives litigants
only twenty-eight days to file new trial motions-including for reasons of spoliation. After that short
window closes, a party seeking relief must show more than that her adversary spoliated evidence. She
must show that information was suppressed and that the suppression was undiscoverable before. Id.
And things only get harder from there: to earn relief for spoliation more than a year after judgment, the
complaining party must show "fraud upon the court." Id.
57. Id. at 806.
58. Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1292-94.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. The rule was first proposed as part of Edson Sunderland's sweeping
package of discovery devices, see Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 718-19, 727-28 (1998), and
then revived decades later by scholars like Wayne Brazil, see supra note 6.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
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also relevant information that would not. A lawyer holding a document
devastating to her client's case, for example, would have to disclose that
information to her adversary-automatically. It was no surprise, then, that
critics warned of adversarial distortion and ethical "strain."
62
At least some of that strain was to be expected. Early advocates of modem
discovery touted lofty objectives-litigation streamlined by "mutual
knowledge," outcomes improved by shared information. 63 But these advocates
also understood how adversarialism tends to work: lawyers seek to exploit
every advantage; new rules encourage novel kinds of "gamesmanship." 64 The
aim of automatic disclosure was thus to change this "game" at its core. It
sought to shift attorneys' "primary" loyalties during discovery from client to
court, 65 to elevate lawyer "professionalism," 66 and to transform a sport of
information "hide and seek" into one of "show and tell."67
It is unclear if the project has succeeded. One detailed study, a late 1990s
investigation by the Federal Judicial Center, reported something positive: it
found that automatic civil disclosure was "working as intended"--even if many
respondents still disliked the rule. 68 Another late 1990s study, this one
conducted by RAND, described something less promising: it found that
mandatory disclosure produced neither "significantly reduced lawyer work
hours" nor "significantly reduced time to disposition.' 69 Automatic disclosure
may thus seem (to some) like a failed experiment. 70 Or it may seem (to others)
like a solution in search of a problem, an unwarranted reaction to the "myth" of
pervasive discovery abuse. 71
61. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note ("The initial disclosure obligations of
[Rule 26(a)]... have been narrowed to identification of witnesses and documents that the disclosing
party may use to support its claims or defenses.... A party is no longer obligated to disclose witnesses
or documents, whether favorable or unfavorable, that it does not intend to use.").
62. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61 U.S.L.W. 4392-94 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (Apr. 27, 1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 507-11 (1993); see also Griffin B. Bell et al.,
Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 46 (1992).
63. Brazil, supra note 40, at 810; see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
64. "Because so many civil cases are settled before trial . . . much of the decisive
gamesmanship of modem litigation takes place in private settings." Brazil, supra note 6, at 1304.
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 820 (1991) ("[C]ontemporary federal practice instead encourages
gamesmanship.").
65. Brazil, supra note 6, at 1350.
66. Mullenix, supra note 64, at 808 n.64.
67. Id. at821-22.
68. Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C.
L. REV. 683, 686 (1998).
69. Id. at 687; see also Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51 (1997).
70. Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A Controversial Device with No Effects, 21
PACE L. REV. 203, 207-08 (2000). My goal is not to refute these skeptics. It may be that Rule 26(a) is
as ineffective in practice as it is dramatic in theory. But the rule's day-to-day operation is separate from
(if still revealing about) my chief concern: the rule's purported information role.
71. Mullenix, supra note 41, at 1396; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IowA L. REV. 821, 849-50 (2010) (noting that existing
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But if automatic disclosure remains a "triumph of hope over
experience,"' 72 its information commitments are no less plain. Automatic
disclosure favors access over adversarialism, cooperation over competition, and
adjudicative accuracy over litigation sport. And like evidence tampering before
it, automatic disclosure tilts against keeping secrets-leaning the opposite
direction of work product doctrine.
3. Work Product Doctrine
Work product doctrine is an information shield. It protects from ordinary
discovery information "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial
' 73 -
though not always to the same extent. Some of that information, like an
attorney's mental impressions, is always off-limits. 74 Some, like a document's
facts, can be accessed upon a special showing.7 5 And some, like a person's own
statements, can be acquired by that person on demand. 76
This shield was for a long time unnecessary. Before the late 1930s, when
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated and liberal
discovery first took hold,77 federal civil litigation involved scant pretrial
exchange: parties knew only those facts their opponents put into their
pleadings; 78 attorneys withheld information and tried to engineer surprise.
79
Work product doctrine had no place in this game of "blindman's bluff.,80 It
would have protected only information that would not have been disclosed.
Things changed in the 1940s. The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
forced litigants to make relevant information available to their adversaries
rles-like Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(d) and (f)(3)(B)-empower courts to prevent
"unwarranted 'fishing expeditions').
72. Mullenix, supra note 64, at 820.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
74. See FED. R. CiV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (shielding "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative").
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) ("Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative .... ").
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(C) ("Any party or other person may, on request and without
the required showing, obtain the person's own previous statement about the action or its subject
matter.").
77. Proceduralists seem to disagree on the precise date. See Jeff A. Anderson et al., The Work
Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 766 (1983) ('The adoption in 1937 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure initiated a slow revolution .... "); Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine:
Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 918 (1983) ("A major change occurred in 1938 ... 
Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1518 ("Before the 1939 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
78. See Cohn, supra note 77, at 918.
79. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law, Accessing
Law, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 698 (2006). For a thoughtful review of adversarial advocacy, see
Norman Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense ofAdversary System Values, 93 CORNELL
L.REv. 1377, 1401-08 (2008).
80. See Cohn, supra note 77, at 918.
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before trial, at least when properly asked.81 Litigants in turn urged courts to
exclude certain categories of information from discovery's wide purview.
Information compiled specifically for litigation--or "trial preparation
material"--was one such category.
82
The Supreme Court responded in 1947. In Hickman v. Taylor, it created a
common law doctrine designed to curb "unwarranted inquiries" into attorneys'
minds and files. 83 Not all information was equal under Hickman: It made facts
located in trial preparation materials accessible only upon a heightened
showing. And it made attorney mental impressions legally sacrosanct, beyond
the reach of even discovery's most expansive tools. Still, Hickman proved a
challenge to implement: Lower courts struggled to delimit the doctrine's scope
and to deploy its heightened standard.84 And advisory committee members
struggled to fit the doctrine into a body of preexisting rules.8 5 It was 1970
before work product doctrine was codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3).
86
Like Hickman itself, Rule 26(b)(3) concentrates on trial preparation
material. It separates facts from opinions. And it provides for the ready
disclosure of a person's own statements. 87 But Rule 26(b)(3) varies from
Hickman in notable part too. Hickman covers both tangible and intangible work
product, Rule 26(b)(3) only "documents and tangible things." Hickman protects
work product of attorneys alone, Rule 26(b)(3) of non-attorneys as well. And
Hickman announces a doctrine that may seem somehow "flexible," Rule
26(b)(3) a more rigid-seeming rule.
88
Yet if these work product standards slightly differ, they grow from
justifications largely the same. One of those justifications is utilitarian: work
product doctrine aims to smooth the operation of our adversarial process. It
carves out space for antagonistic attorneys to assemble information, to test legal
theories, and to devise litigation strategy without fear of unwelcome
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. Yeazell, supra note 79, at 699 ("We have put in the hands of civil
litigants powers that in manylegal systems only state officials enjoy.").
82. See Anderson et al., supra note 77, at 765 ("Courts developed the work product doctrine to
ease [the] tension" that existed "between an attorney's obligation to his client and his duty to respond
to discovery requests.").
83. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,510 (1947).
84. See Anderson et al., supra note 77, at 780-84 (discussing the period after Hiclanan but
before Rule 26(b)(3)).
85. Id. at 782.
86. See Thomburg, supra note 13, at 1519-20.
87. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(C).
88. Anderson et al., supra note 77, at 763; see also Frank Betz Assocs., Inc. v. Jim Walter
Homes, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 533, 534 (D.S.C. 2005) ("When applying the work product privilege
to... nontangible information, the principles enunciated in Hiclnan apply, as opposed to Rule
26(b)(3) ...."); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary
Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 679 (1975) (noting that a party could argue that Rule 26(b)(3)
supersedes Hiclan ).
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exposure. 89 It assures parties that they are receiving faithful and unfettered
legal advice. 90 And it protects attorneys as professionals-their reputations,
their roles at trial, and their proprietary interests in the work they do. 9 1 Another
(related) justification links to law and economics: work product doctrine is
meant to safeguard legal preparation and thus to encourage more valuable
preparation to be done.92 Absent work product doctrine, some say, parties
would lack sufficient incentive to investigate-and they might overinvest in
hiding what information they have.93 Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3) help forestall
such inefficiency. They promote zealous advocacy by keeping some of its
pieces concealed.
Not everyone finds this account convincing. Some argue that work
product doctrine should be abolished-that it favors well-heeled defendants,
stifles fair outcomes, and imposes too high a social cost. 94 But work product
doctrine frames these features as inevitable. It subordinates truth to privacy, full
access to adversarialism, and cooperation to competition, not for glib or
disposable reasons, but so "our adversarial system" can work.95 And unlike
peremptory-challenge doctrine, work product doctrine suggests that attorneys'
thoughts and opinions simply should not be probed.
4. Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges were first a tool of sovereigns. 96 The earliest such
challenges, limited to capital cases but unlimited in number, gave the Crown
the sole power to strike jurors without assignment of reason or cause. 97 Royal
prosecutors could thus remove jurors without explanation-not because of an
abiding faith in their ability to root out bias by hunch or intuition, but because
they were agents of an infallible king. All of the Crown's challenges, explained
or not, were assumed to be well taken.
98
89. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
90. Id
91. See Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1538.
92. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 359 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 356-64.
One might say that this argument builds from a base of dynamic, rather than static, utilitarianism.
93. See Easterbrook, supra note 92, at 360; Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1546 ("Work product
immunity ... is necessary to provide adequate private incentive to investigate.").
94. See Thomburg, supra note 13, at 1550-61 (noting too that current doctrine particularly
benefits repeat players).
95. Or so the argument goes. See Cohn, supra note 77, at 919.
96. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 14, at 819.
97. Id
98. For this reason, scholars have distinguished early peremptories from modem ones. See id
at 819-20 ("[ln the beginning the Crown's unlimited peremptory challenges were in fact challenges
for cause .... "); id at 844-47 ("Thus, the royal peremptory challenge was not really a peremptory
challenge at all .... ); Alschuler, supra note 16, at 165 n.51 ("[T]he [early] peremptory challenge was
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Almost as soon as royal prosecutors began to use peremptory challenges,
however, defendants did too. English courts first allowed defendants to exercise
peremptory challenges as a matter of common law-though not in unlimited
numbers. 99 Then Parliament turned peremptories completely over: it endorsed
defendant challenges while eliminating prosecutorial ones in 1305. 100 For more
than five centuries after-in England and then in America-jury selection
looked largely that way: peremptory challenges were the "exclusive right" of
defendants. Prosecutors had recourse only to other kinds of tools. 1
01
American prosecutors regained the peremptory power mostly in the
shadow of the Civil War. 102 In 1865, Congress provided for a small number of
prosecutor peremptories in federal criminal trials-and many states followed
suit. 103 Numbers varied in subsequent statutes. 10 4 But by 1946-with the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-both defense and
prosecution had as many as twenty peremptory challenges in some criminal
cases. 105 Federal civil parties were "entitled" to no fewer than three. 1
06
Explanations for this "entitlement" are by now familiar. Some cast
peremptory challenges as a crucial procedural bulwark-a backstop for "for
cause" challenges, 17 a means to express stereotypes "we dare not say but know
[are] true,'' 1 8 and a didactic (or "symbolic-educative") device for teaching the
public about the jury's civic significance. 109 Others claim that peremptories
make jury decisions appear fairer and more palatable, if only because they give
litigants a measure of juror choice." 0 But still others see in peremptories very
simply an economical means of accomplishing objectives that we now pursue by permitting challenges
for cause.").
99. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 819-20, 822; (noting that England abolished peremptories in
1989).
100. See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9 (1990).
101. When it lost the power of the peremptory, the Crown simply turned to other devices. See
Alschuler, supra note 16, at 166 n.53 ("In practice ... the Crown's power to ask prospective jurors to
'stand by' affords the Crown a broader power to exclude .... ).
102. Colbert, supra note 100, at 11. Some states allowed prosecutor peremptories a bit earlier.
Id. at 11 n.39.
103. Hoffinan, supra note 14, at 826-27.
104. Id. at 827.
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006).
107. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power, " 27 STAN. L. REv.
545, 554 (1975).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 552, 555.
110. See id. at 552 ("[The] decision should be followed because in a real sense the jury belongs
to the litigant: he chooses it."). This "buy-in" argument has a deep provenance: Lord Blackstone
argued that a "prisoner... should have a good opinion of his jury." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *346-47. And Justice White, in the now-derided Swain v. Alabama, added a modem
voice:
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides,
but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the
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little worth preserving. They see instead a device that invites jury stacking,
II
limits the "range of perspectives" voiced in any jury room, 112 leaves jurors
cynical about the trial system generally," 3 and divides people by pernicious
means-not transparent choices or extraordinary knowledge, but biased
guesses and crude group stereotypes. 14 Peremptory challenges are not, to these
critics, essential to empanelling an impartial jury. They are the "most
undemocratic feature of our democratic trial system" 115 and the "Last Best
Tool of Jim Crow."
116
Still, for much of its American history, that "last best tool" was celebrated
and scarcely regulated by courts." 7 Parties exercised their peremptory
challenges for all manner of reasons-race and gender, hairstyle and whim-
and courts did little to stop them. 8 But by the early 1990s a different "rule"
had emerged: No lawyer in any civil 19 or criminal case could peremptorily
strike a juror on the basis of race or gender. 120 Parties could remove jurors for
odd and idiosyncratic reasons-or for no reason at all-but not for select
prohibited ones.
basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory
satisfies the rle that to perform its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.
380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
111. Cf Hans Zeisel, Affirmative Peremptory Juror Selection, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1165 (1987)
(discussing affirmative peremptory choices-a device that would stack juries by design).
112. Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73
TEx. L. REV. 1041, 1064 (1995); see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(Marshall, J.) ("When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and experience, the range
of which is unknown....").
113. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 856-58. Excused jurors are not alone in their cynicism. Seated
jurors too may feel the hard effects of peremptory practice, and the juries on which they serve may
come to seem strategically "balkaniz[ed]." Id at 866 ("Even if peremptory challenges do not in fact
result in the balkanization of juries, they create the unmistakable impression that balkanization is the
goal.").
114. Alschuler, supranote 16, at 156, 163, 167, 211.
115. Id at 156.
116. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 827; see also NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN
JURIES: THE VERDICT 97 (2007) ("Contemporary studies of peremptory challenges show clear
patterns linked to race.").
117. See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 506 n.1 1 (1948) (deeming the peremptory
challenge "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused").
118. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); cf Charles Nesson, Peremptory Challenges:
Technology Should Kill Them?, 3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 1 (2004) (labeling Swain "stunningly
unjust").
119. See Edmunson v. Leesville, 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
120. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (extending Batson's prohibition on race-based peremptory challenges to challenges based on
prospective juror's gender); see also United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438-39 (9th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (comparing race and gender bias while chronicling the pernicious gender
stereotypes-like the so-called "defect of sex"--that long excluded women from jury service)
(citations omitted).
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Enforcing this rule has proven quite difficult. 121 That enforcement entails
three steps. To show that a party impermissibly exercised a peremptory
challenge, her opponent must first make a prima facie showing: she must raise
an inference that the excused juror was challenged because of gender or race.122
If that prima facie showing is made, the other party must then proffer race- or
gender-neutral explanations for making her strikes; she must provide reasons,
that is, for using a tool designed not to require reasons at all. ' 23 Then a court
must weigh all of the evidence, asking if the neutral reasons are pretextual and
if prohibited discrimination in fact occurred. 124
Courts find such discrimination only rarely. 25 Skeptical parties do make
prima facie cases "relatively" easily-or so detailed studies tend to show.
126
But their opponents state "neutral" reasons just as readily-and courts often
accept even the thinnest ones. 127 Modem peremptory challenges may thus aim
to purge discrimination from the jury selection process. They may also hope, in
their way, to force sensitive information about trial strategy into the open.128
But they may succeed at pushing discrimination only deeper beneath the
surface. 129 And they may prompt attorneys to tell only more facile sorts of lies.
The story of peremptory challenges may thus be a story of unintended
consequences. But it is a story too of information commitments-to
competition over cooperation, to privacy over access, and to intuition over
explanation-though only to a point. Peremptory challenge doctrine opens a
window into the minds of adversarial attorneys, forcing them (after a threshold
showing) to explain something that may defy explanation. Unlike work product
doctrine, then, peremptory challenge doctrine may expose attorney thoughts
121. William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 S.
CT. REV. 97, 134 (calling modem peremptory doctrine an "enforcement nightmare").
122. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97; .E.B., 511 U.S. at 127.
123. J.E.B.,511 U.S. at 127.
124. Id.
125. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460-69 (1996). Melilli's study "considers
virtually every relevant reported decision of every federal and state court" for a seven-year period. Id
at 448. It thus avoids the deficits and distortions that might follow looking only at appellate court
opinions.
126. Idat460,467.
127. Id. at 460-61, 468; Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to
Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1075 (2011) (concluding that Batson fails-and will continue to fail-to eliminate race-based
use of peremptories); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 169 (2005) ("Satisfying Batson's second step is trivial.").
That Batson's second step is trivial may be both true and unremarkable. All of the real legal energy
may focus on step three, when the court is called on to weigh evidence of discrimination. So the failure
of Batson, if indeed it has failed, comes as much at its end as in its middle.
128. See Melilli, supra note 125, at 484 ("Up until Batson, the peremptory challenge was not
only a sacred cow ... but a secret one as well.").
129. Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[J]udicial
experience with peremptory challenges proves that they are a cloak for discrimination .... ").
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and mental impressions. And unlike bans on juror testimony, peremptory
challenge doctrine may seek out-rather than stifle-unsettling facts.
5. Juror Testimony
Juries keep powerful secrets.1 30 Our trial system asks its jurors to make
ultimate judgments-about guilt and liability, imprisonment and fines-but
then turns its head to how they decide. Jury conclusions come mostly in the
form of "impenetrable" general verdicts.1 31 Deliberations remain largely
confined to the jury room's "black box."'132 Only when deliberations are
infected by extraneous prejudice or outside influence may jurors testify about
them. 133 So only rarely will jurors divulge to courts what occurred. Modem
trial practice may still conceal a great deal from juries-legal concepts,
pertinent facts-but this juries hide in return. 134
Their secrecy is not new. More than two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield
first forbade jurors from impeaching their own verdicts-even when reporting
their own misdeeds.' 35 Others soon refuted Mansfield's key premise, a civil
law maxim holding that witnesses "shall not be heard to allege [their] own
turpitude."' 136 But the ban on juror testimony persisted-and, before long, new
justifications emerged. 1
37
These justifications draw on varied impulses. One is plainly religious: it
casts the jury as divinely inspired-and it deems any threat to jury secrecy as
"impious" as doubting the judgments of God. 138 Still more are pragmatic: they
emphasize the importance of finality, 139 the need to shield jurors from
postverdict harassment, 140 and the value of secrecy in promoting full, free, and
130. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict
Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 314 (deeming secrecy a "core" jury "characteristic"); W.R.
CORNISH, THE JURY 258 (1968).
131. Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258-61 (1920).
132. Fisher, supra note 10, at 579; see Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427
(2008).
133. My description here is overstated by a shade: jurors may also testify about mistakes on the
verdict form. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
134. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 578.
135. Vaise v. Delaval, [1785] 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B.).
136. See, e.g., 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2353, at 699 (John T. McNaughton ed.,
rev. ed. 1961) (wondering why the law would admit the testimony of a "bailiff whose shameless
[intrusion] upon [jury] privacy forms his only qualification as a witness" but still "sanctimoniously
put[] away the juryman who reports his own misconduct"); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 7-8 (1977).
137. See Alschuler, supra note 16, at 222.
138. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G.
Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956). Holdsworth also explained that trial by jury, like the ordeals by water and
fire it supplanted, was supposed to work mysteriously. Id
139. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.
107,120 (1987).
140. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 119-20.
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frank deliberation. 41 And yet another is more cynical: it frames jury secrecy as
a way to secure public confidence and enhance system legitimacy-not by
ensuring flawless decisions, but by hiding any inaccuracy inside the jury's
black box. 142
Attempts to peek into this box have often ended badly. In 1954, for
example, the Chicago Jury Project recorded deliberations in five federal civil
cases. 143 Though both court and counsel consented to the effort, the jurors were
taped without their knowledge-and news of the study soon leaked. By 1955,
an angry Senate subcommittee had summoned project leaders, labeled their
research a threat to national security, and compared their work to the most
sensational "Communist bugaboos of the day."' 144 By 1956, it was a crime to
record, listen to, or observe any federal jury deliberations. 1
45
Less than two decades later, the Federal Rules of Evidence added an
express prohibition on certain kinds of juror testimony. Like the common law
rule it followed, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars jurors from testifying
about their deliberations-at least when that testimony would impeach the
jury's verdict. 146 And like the Supreme Court's own pre-606(b) doctrine, Rule
606(b) admits some narrow exceptions: Jurors may help correct mistakes on
verdict forms. They may also testify about the impact of extraneous prejudice
or outside influence on the decision-making process.147 A court may thus hear
postverdict juror testimony about bribes, independent research, and threats to
141. See id; Goldstein, supra note 130, at 300 (noting that the functional justifications of Rule
606(b) "conform perfectly [to] the utilitarian conception of privileged communications").
142. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 579-80; Alschuler, supra note 16, at 228 (critiquing the
rule's "hear-no-evil posture"). Steve Yeazell offers a more sanguine explanation:
[1]f summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law are operating properly, only close
cases-cases that could rationally be decided either way-will go to the jury. In such cases,
any verdict should be sustainable. And, some would add, in such cases the soft variables
that constitute the jury's sense of justice should come into play, even when those variables
are hard to justify from the lofty plane of rationalism. By preventing too close an inquiry
into [a] jury's decision processes, one allows these variables some free play.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 622 (7th ed. 2008).
143. Though the project took the name of Chicago, the taping occurred in Wichita. HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, at xiv-xv (Phoenix ed., 1971); cf Shari Seidman
Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Rumination on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001)
(presenting the "Arizona Jury Project," which involved Arizona Supreme Court-approved videotaping
of forty civil cases, deliberations included).
144. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 6 (2d ed. 2008). The Attorney General also issued a public
censure. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 143, at xv.
145. Act of Aug. 2, 1956, ch. 879, § 1, 70 Stat. 935 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1508
(2006)); see KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 143, at xv ("[T]he enactment of statutes in some thirty-odd
jurisdictions prohibiting jury-taping ...."); see also Benjamin T. Huebner, Beyond Tanner. An
Alternative Framework for Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469, 1487-90 (2006)
(compiling data of all state approaches to postverdict juror testimony).
146. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
147. Id; see also Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1892) (permitting a juror to
testify about "improper influences" and "external causes"--but not internal ones).
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juror safety. But it must ignore tales of aggressive jury room politicking, poorly
made decisions, and drug-addled jurors too.1
48
There is a bluntness to this ban. It shields "improper juror behavior" as
much as robust jury argument--cocaine abuse as much as forceful dialogue. 1
49
But this awkwardness cannot be avoided--or so contends the Court. Rule
606(b) must favor finality over "perfect[ion]," appearance over access, and
secrecy over spotlight simply for the "jury system [to] survive."'1 50 Justice may
require some information to be available when trial begins, then, but it may
also demand that some stay hidden after trial ends.
B. A Stylized Case
Of course, few cases get that far. Most federal civil claims stop well short
of trial-many because of pretrial mechanisms like summary judgment, even
more because of settlement.15 The fictional "case" that follows is thus stylized
in two senses: First, it traces a dispute from before filing until after verdict, a
timeline that fewer than two percent of all federal civil cases complete.
52
Second, it self-consciously-and perhaps atypically--emphasizes some of the
information themes and tensions raised in the doctrinal review above. Still,
there is nothing far-fetched in this fiction, and it illustrates how information
rules can both coordinate and clash.
So think, again, of a workplace dispute. An employee of a large
corporation contends that she was fired, not because her work was inadequate,
but because she rebuffed the lewd advances of her longtime boss. The boss and
his supervisors know all about the employee's unhappiness-both because she
148. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 116-27 (1987). At least, again, when told by
the jurors themselves.
149. Id. at 120.
150. Id.
151. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 636, 662 (suggesting that the rate of civil settlement could be as high as 60 to 70
percent); see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the
Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995) (criticizing the pervasiveness of settlement); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984) (same); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the
advantages enjoyed by repeat litigation players); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that only cases with uncertain
outcomes would be brought to trial); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 337, 349-50 (1990) (testing, and
apparently refuting, the Priest-Klein argument).
152. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 512 tbl.7 (2004) (illustrating that, in
2002, only 1.8 percent of federal civil cases reached trial). Fewer still proceed through jury verdict,
since some of the 2 percent are bench trials and some settle at the trial stage. I leave it to others, for
now, to condemn or to cheer the vanishing trial. See ROBERT P. BURNs, THE DEATH OF THE




has already hinted at legal action and because a full folder of company email
chronicles their various (mis)deeds. Access to this folder might seal the
employee's case-or at least strengthen it markedly-so her adversaries would
likely wish to destroy it. But spoliation rules require the opposite: the
corporation must preserve the very information that may later doom it.
Availability and accuracy trump adversarialism, at least at the start.
If the corporation plans to use one of those emails in support of a defense,
of course, it must disclose that email once the case is filed. The employee's
careful attorney must share much of her work too-the line of friendly
witnesses she has assembled, the stacks of favorable evidence she has
compiled, and the intricate damage calculations she has made-for this is what
automatic civil disclosure now requires. Neither the corporation's counsel nor
the careful attorney must automatically divulge unfavorable information. And
work product doctrine would seem to prohibit any access to the lawyers'
opinions and trial strategies. But this work-product protection is already
precarious: by disclosing so much information that they deem to be favorable,
the corporation and the careful attorney may reveal their strategies anyway-in
the shadows if not in the light.
They may also reveal those strategies later, though still before trial starts.
Imagine, then, that automatic disclosure and formal discovery have finished.
Both parties, equipped with more information than before, still wish to take
their chances before a jury. The employee and her careful attorney think their
strong evidentiary case will fare well at trial. The corporation and its counsel
believe they can persuade a skeptical fact finder-particularly if it is mostly (or
entirely) male. 153 So as jury selection proceeds, the corporation exercises its
peremptory challenges in a predictable but troubling way: it excuses as many
women as it can. Spotting this pattern, the careful attorney asks the court to
act-and she makes a prima facie showing of improper peremptory use. The
corporation responds with an array of neutral reasons: one juror looked drowsy,
it says; another seemed preoccupied. Both the court and the careful attorney
think these reasons dubious, but the court chooses not to intervene. 54 It
empanels a jury with only one woman. The corporation's strategy works even
as it becomes obvious. And what would have been hidden under work product
doctrine becomes, as trial inches forward, abundantly clear.
153. Cf Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury
and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 491-92, 519 (noting
that lawyers believe that "they occasionally win" cases by "shrewd use of their peremptory
challenges," and concluding that "cases in which peremptory challenges have an important effect on
the verdict occur with some frequency"); David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in
Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10, 122-28 (2001)
(concluding that discriminatory use of peremptories had an effect on outcomes, increasing the
likelihood of death verdicts for defendants).
154. Cf Melilli, supra note 125 (examining Batson practice empirically).
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Here that trial favors the defendant. The jury delivers a verdict against the
employee, offering no explanation on its "general" form. 155 But a few days
later a single juror makes an unsettling announcement: he reveals that the jury
decided against the employee, not because her evidence was lacking, but
because the jurors misunderstood the law. Had those jurors better understood
the employee's claim, he feels sure, they would have decided her way. Only a
clumsy but correctible jury error kept her from relief.
Happy as the employee may be to hear this revelation, it will do her little
good. Limits on juror testimony keep courts from using this kind of information
to impeach jury verdicts. The loose-lipped juror's insight may well be
instructive. It may even seem as critical to an accurate outcome as the
preservation of the corporation's email folder and the compelled exchange of
supporting evidence. But here finality trumps accuracy. The black box stays
effectively sealed-and the system turns a deaf ear.
A troubling workplace dispute thus ends almost where it began. A
discharged employee is still upset by her dismissal; a large corporation is still
free of liability. But the story of this dispute hints at something less case
specific too. It hints at an information architecture built of inevitable tensions
and essential tradeoffs. Aspects of that architecture express varied (and
variable) information commitments-to accuracy and access, finality and
fairness, cooperation and competition. They also cast legal actors in ambivalent
roles-a corporation both reprehensible enough to tolerate sexual harassment
and responsible enough to preserve harmful evidence; 56 a careful attorney both
partisan enough to pursue victory and impartial enough to promote the search
for truth;1 57 and a loose-lipped juror both authoritative enough to render a
verdict and incidental enough, soon after, to ignore in court. 158 These roles and
commitments may be global oddities, legal anomalies largely absent from other
nations' courts.1 59 But they are central to modem American civil litigation.
And they are what Part II more thoroughly explores.
155. Sunderland, supra note 131.
156. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 315 ("[T]he lawyer certainly may, and arguably
must, provide her clients with complete and accurate advice, even when she reasonably believes that
doing so will cause them to withhold or suppress evidence."); cf Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1218
("[A]ccording to many judges and practitioners, evidence tampering is hardly confined to blockbuster
events.").
157. See LANGBE1N, supra note 9, at 332; cf Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1915 ("[A]ll major
classes of civil litigants seem to view evidence gathering, together with defensive tactics to fight
opponents' evidence gathering, as primarily the job of lawyers.").
158. See FED. R. EViD. 606(b).
159. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 733.
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II.
THE SYSTEM
American civil litigation has a clever versatility. Parties may use it to give
voice to grievance. 16 0 Courts may use it to give shape to standards.
1 6 1 And
society may use it to edge closer to truth. 162 At each occasion, the system's
values surface and recede, sometimes pulling in tandem and sometimes peeling
apart: Zealous advocacy ensures participatory access-but then obstructs the
search for "right" answers.' 63 Efficient process promotes timely resolution-
but then limits consideration of individual need. Blind eyes control public
perception-but then cloud our understanding of legal outcomes. 
164
This Part makes better sense of those conflicting impulses and
complicated demands. It begins, in Part II.A, with a partial catalog of the many
tandems and tensions introduced in Part I-some that trace specific rule
interactions (like the uneasy link between automatic disclosure and work
product doctrine), others that suggest ambivalence about our elastic information
preferences. Part II.B then maps and remaps the information rules examined
above along three familiar lines-adjudicative accuracy, civil adversarialism,
and procedural equality-searching out where those rules collaborate, when
they counterbalance, and how they might contribute to litigation legitimacy.
Part II.C then fits these information rules into a new (and hopefully instructive)
typology, one made of four basic categories: valid information, invalid
160. See, e.g., id. at 737 (touting "the American legal system['s] ... remarkable ability to hold
the powerful to account while treating the weak with some respect"); Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153,
1172-77 (noting that litigation allows parties' "wills" to be "counted").
161. Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between
Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (1995)
("[A]djudication is about articulating public norms as well as settling private disputes .... "); JOSEPH
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITCS 358 (1994)
("Principled decisions are reasoned and public. As such they become known, feed expectations, and
breed a common understanding of the legal culture of the country .... ").
162. I do not claim that these are litigation's only objectives. Nor do I claim that any one
commitment outranks any other. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 737 ("[A]ny sentence that
begins 'The goal of X is...' [is] either vacuous or demonstrably false."). A more exhaustive catalog of
values would be long and familiar. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 160, at 1172-77 (dignity,
participation, deterrence, and effectuation); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 482-91 (1986) (equality,
appearance of fairness, predictability, transparency, rationality, participation, revelation, and privacy-
dignity); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 859 (1984) (consistency, autonomy,
impartiality, rationality, formality, finality, and economy); see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW 270 (2006) ("[P]eople's motivation to cooperate with others, in this case legal
authorities, is rooted in social relationships and ethical judgments .... ").
163. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 315-16 (noting that detecting truth-obscuring
forms of legal advice is difficult); Frankel, supra note 24, at 1039 ("[T]he gladiator using the weapons
in the courtroom is not primarily crusading after truth, but seeking to win.").
164. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 705 ("The jury's secrecy is an aid to legitimacy, for the
privacy of the jury box shrouds the shortcomings of its methods.").
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.. .• 165information, valid misinformation, and invalid misinformation. The goal of
this typology is not to displace all others. It aims instead to rethink a complex
system of legal information-to reconsider, that is, how our system's
commitments to accuracy, adversarialism, and equality help fashion our
information rules. And it hopes to begin a broader dialogue about civil
litigation, linking the rule-focused detail from the pages above to the important
IB study that comes below.
A. Intersections Big and Small
A related caveat: what follows is limited and speculative by design. It
aims to identify areas of overlap and intersection, not to offer an exhaustive
comparative summary or to anchor a program of law reform. Members of both
bench and bar know how easy it is to draw lines between two points: disparate
cases can be joined by loose analogy, dissimilar concepts connected by thin
thread.166 What follows aims to be more durable than that-both as the
beginning of an inquiry and a frame for its end.
A first information intersection thus links a rule more forceful before a
case starts with a rule more important almost after it stops. It connects, that is,
bars on evidence tampering with those on juror testimony. These rules have
something crucial in common: Both speak in terms of proscription. Both
prevent those holding pertinent information, that is, from using (or abusing) it
in any way they might like. But the rules are hardly identical: The bar on
evidence tampering purports to include more information in the adjudicative
mix, the bar on juror testimony to include less. The first preserves information
so it can be later revealed; the other silences information so it can be judicially
ignored. 167
A second intersection marks a similar tension. Automatic civil disclosure
and work product doctrine both shape the beginning of litigation--one by
mandating the early exchange of favorable information, the other by shielding a
range of preparatory work. But like the limits on evidence tampering and juror
testimony, automatic disclosure and work product doctrine pull in two ways at
once. Automatic disclosure aims to lay a case-in-chief bare. It hopes to enhance
accuracy, not just through easy access to opponent information, but through the
elimination of strategic surprise: no surprise evidence, "no surprise witnesses,
165. As I will stress again below, this new typology is meant simply to shed new light on
under-appreciated themes and to raise the questions taken up in Part HI.
166. See, e.g., Keith A. Rosten, The Scaffolding for Legal Infrastructure: Developing
Sustainable Approaches, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395, 408-09 (2008) ("The Hora is a Jewish folk
dance, which, presumably, would not be particularly useful to teach in a country such as Iraq. Yet,
when it comes to developing legal infrastructure in Iraq, even some of the brightest minds thought little
of imposing a wholly alien U.S. financial disclosure law on postwar Iraq.").
167. "[I]n the vast majority of cases the verdict is a complete mystery, throwing a mantle of
impenetrable darkness over the operations of the jury." Sunderland, supra note 131, at 260.
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and no surprise testimony." 1 68 Work product doctrine, by contrast, aims to hold
some information in reserve. It hopes to sustain adversarialism through
"uncooperative action" and litigation secrecy 169: Some bits of information, like
the facts in an informal interview, are made harder to uncover. And some bits
of information, like attorney mental impressions, are said to be untouchable. 1
70
Yet even these impressions are not so perfectly guarded, at least when
automatic disclosure works. Attorneys who share what automatic disclosure
demands reveal more than the identities of knowledgeable individuals or the
location of relevant things. They reveal portions of their professional opinions
and trial strategies too. What they disclose, after all, is not aimless. It is "to
support," however faintly, some legal plan. 171
A third intersection tracks a comparable line. It links the secretive element
of work product doctrine with something similar in peremptory challenge law.
Both work product and peremptory challenges aim to conceal litigant strategy.
And both try, in the name of adversarialism, to seal off the inner workings of
attorneys' minds.172 But the two splinter in form if not in effect: work product
doctrine builds a screen that aims to be impenetrable. No heightened work-
product showing will spur exposure of an attorney's legal opinions or tactical
thoughts. Peremptory challenge law, by contrast, raises a screen that can
ostensibly be pierced. A prima facie showing of peremptory misuse attempts to
force attorneys to state real reasons for their challenges, thus pushing their
strategic priorities much closer to the light. 1
73
A fourth intersection involves peremptory challenges as well. But this pair
knits peremptories, not to work product doctrine, but to bans on juror
testimony. The connection is not entirely subtle: Both doctrines concern juries.
Both have deep roots in common law. And both evince a fundamental mistrust,
a kind of paternalistic tendency to treat jurors like "children" incapable of
meeting "adult standards of responsibility."' 74 Still, the timing of that mistrust
is notably different: peremptory challenge doctrine locates its mistrust before
trial begins, testimonial bans after trial ends. And the information currents flow
168. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 713.
169. Thomburg, supra note 13, at 1516.
170. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
171. FED. R. CrY. P. 26.
172. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 870 ("[T]he peremptory challenge system is a kind of
adversary process gone amok....").
173. Cf Melilli, supra note 125, at 460-68 (noting that current peremptory doctrine makes it
easy for lawyers to offer neutral and sometimes pretextual explanations).
174. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 211, 232. This metaphor may strike some as oversold. Some
may still think, like Professor Alschuler, that both peremptories and Rule 606(b) cast jurors as
children-the first because it assumes they cannot set aside preexisting notions, the second because it
silences some who may now be eager to speak. But one person's paternalism is another person's
respect: rather than treating jurors like children, peremptories may simply credit the knowledge and
experience jurors bring to jury service; Rule 606(b), in tam, may simply encourage jurors to speak
anywhere but the witness box.
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differently too: Peremptory challenge doctrine shields information about
jurors-opinions formed by others (perhaps clumsily or cynically) about the
jurors themselves. Bans on juror testimony, by contrast, shield information held
by jurors-facts available only to those with access to the deliberation room.
The first keeps secrets about why jurors were selected. The second keeps
secrets about what they have done. 
175
A fifth intersection looks rather different. It pairs spoliation with
automatic civil disclosure. The two rules diverge in key places: Automatic
disclosure requires the affirmative sharing of items favorable to the discloser.
Spoliation demands only the safeguarding of sometimes-unfavorable things.'
176
But the match is still quite compatible: Both rules promote greater access to
information-one by releasing information between adversaries, the other by
preserving information in actual form. Both also shape the beginning of civil
disputes.
And there may be something to this shared timing. Spoliation and
automatic disclosure may share information commitments, that is, precisely
because they are early-case rules. 17 7 But these rules and their commitments
shift just as the cases do. Automatic disclosure's demand for cooperation slides,
slowly but steadily, into work product doctrine's more competitive custom.
Spoliation's focus on information access inches, incrementally but perceptibly,
toward the bar on juror testimony's preference for finality. As a case moves
from start to finish, then, other things change with it. A system's information
commitments move in particular directions too.
At least one of those directions is predictable, even obvious: our system
favors finality more as its cases draw nearer to their close. Some information
rules, like spoliation, carry a hint of finality even before a case commences.'78
And others, like the bar on juror testimony, ask courts to ignore late-but-
probative evidence that "the [trial] process did not work."'' 79 But if the shift is
neither inexorable nor costless, the trend is no less evident: finality gains
traction as cases grow old.
175. Or, to be precise, it lets courts ignore those secrets precisely when they may matter most.
176. It does not, that is, require the proactive disclosure of those sometimes-unfavorable
things-at least under the current incarnation of Rule 26. Older versions of that rule demanded the
disclosure of relevant items, even those not favorable to the discloser's case. But today's Rule 26
focuses only on the favorable, leaving discovery of unfavorable items to follow more formal demands.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26. advisory committee's notes ("A party is no longer obligated to disclose
witnesses or documents, whether favorable or unfavorable, that it does not intend to use.").
177. Rule 26's exemptions to initial disclosure may help confirm this point. Actions for review
on an administrative record, actions to enforce arbitration awards, and habeas proceedings are disputes
that are substantially framed and founded by the time they reach federal court. The need for early
access is, by extension, less acute in these actions-and Rule 26 thus excuses them, and some others,
from the demands of automatic disclosure. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
178. See Nesson, supra note 38, at 798 ("[I]f you can suppress evidence for a year after the
verdict, you are home-free.").
179. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 226.
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Other things may lose traction at the same time. One may be our system's
willingness to force information into the open instead of hiding it from the
light-to compel sharing among litigants instead of endorsing adversarial
fights. And another may be the urge to send standard signals to a diverse
audience. A dubious corporate defendant may hear those signals to demand
common evidentiary baselines. A wily attorney may hear them to invite, at
times, thinly convincing lies. And a lay juror may hear them to exhibit a kind of
startling disinterest, an odd indifference to the pursuit of truth ex ante and ex
post. 180
What may startle lay jurors, of course, may do little to stir more seasoned
observers of federal courts. But this matter of timing is no less important for
seeming so obvious to some. Modem civil cases proceed in deliberate,
sequential, and sometimes overlapping stages. 18  And how our legal system
treats information changes just as a case does.
B. Three Maps
But there is more to this system than case chronology. There is more too
than efficient process and administrative ease. 182 Adjudicative accuracy, civil
adversarialism, and procedural equality also shape our information
architecture-as Part I preliminarily showed. This Part examines those
commitments in greater detail. It explores their core meanings, their subtle
tensions, and their apparent tradeoffs, using accuracy, adversarialism, and
equality to map and remap a set of information rules.183 It raises a question,
answered later, about what information our system considers (in)valid. And it
asks how those rules might sustain that system's legitimacy too.
At one time, of course, that legitimacy was said to flow from a single
source: the accuracy of judicial outcomes.' 84 Lawsuits were designed, some
180. Cf Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1316 (noting that, in many places, "the goal of finding
truth ex post [can seem] a poor proxy for the goal of shaping truth ex ante").
181. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006) (proposing that lawsuits track
three stages: a determination ofjusticiability, a ruling on the merits, and a selection of remedy); COVER
& Fiss, supra note 1, at 376 ("Adjudication entails a process of (1) informing the adversaries, their
representatives, and the decisionmaker of relevant matters; (2) assessing that information; and (3)
arriving at relevant conclusions.").
182. Not all rules are administrative equals. Indeed, some rules seem substantially friendlier to
efficient judicial administration than others: bans on juror testimony, for example, seem more likely to
speed legal resolution than do the burden-shifting steps of peremptory challenge doctrine. But the devil
of administration is in the application details. Rule 606(b) may seem easy to implement in theory, for
example, but it may bog down stubbornly on hard facts. I thus concentrate instead on other
commitments-and I fold in some administrative and efficiency ideas as I do.
183. My maps are meant to be general descriptions, not normative endorsements. I do not try to
justify any of these procedural rules by reference to some particular instrumental or moral end, but
instead to capture what the rules do--or at least purport to do.
184. See GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (7th ed. 1805) (noting that evidence
must be used "to make the most exact discernment ... in relation to right"); Michael L. Seigel, A
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claimed, not to salve hurt feelings or to sate participatory urges, but to search
out "truth" and achieve "right result[s]."' 185 Accuracy was more in this account
than a goal of litigation. It was the "single dominant value" of our adjudicative
system 186-as important to civil practice as to science itself. 1
87
But accuracy, even then, never really stood alone. 188 Trial's truth-seeking
function instead "compete[d] with other considerations" I89-- dignity, finality,
stability, cost control-that often constrained the search for truth. 190 Some of
those competitions reduced accuracy to a "very minor" station.19' Others
treated uncovering truth as an instrumental means for reaching socially
"acceptable" results. 192 But if accuracy's measure is but one of many, it still
Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 995, 996 (1994) (lamenting
"evidence scholars' near-universal acceptance of 'optimistic rationalism,' that is, the belief that the
overarching function of evidence law is to maximize the. . . probability that factfinders ... accurately
determine objective ... truth") (citation omitted); see also Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in
Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 382 (1994) ("[A]ccuracy may be valued
because it advances faimess and justice .. .[or] it is important to the system's legitimacy that
adjudication appears to be as accurate as possible ... ").
185. In this account, finding truth is deemed the "paramount" aim of trial and the "sole"
purpose ofajudge. Frankel, supra note 24, at 1033, 1035.
186. Seigel, supra note 184, at 1011 (describing the "rationalist ideal-that the central object of
the law of evidence is to maximize the accuracy of trial verdicts"--as a "foundationalist" theory of
law); see also Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1348
(1987) ("Rules of evidence and procedure are routinely evaluated by their alleged effect on the
accuracy of the trier's factfinding.").
187. To borrow from Stephen Carter:
Science is merely a process, an approach to solving problems, a way of gaining knowledge.
In particular, science seeks to find the best among available answers to questions, to
demonstrate that one hypothesis is so consistent with observation and experiment that we
are justified in calling it "the truth."
Stephen L. Carter, Separatism and Skepticism, 92 YALE L.J. 1334, 1337 (1983) (citation omitted).
188. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 24, at 1037 ("[I]n the last analysis truth is not the only
goal."). None other than Jeremy Bentham, a vigorous critic of truth-stifling evidence rules,
acknowledged that "evidence, even justice itself, like gold, may be bought too dear. It always is bought
too dear, if bought at the expense of a preponderant injustice." 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF
JuDIcIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 482 (1995).
189. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1227, 1228 (2001).
190. See, e.g., Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358-59, 1373, 1378 (1985) ("[T]he object of
judicial factfinding is the generation and projection of acceptable verdicts-verdicts that the public
will view as statements about what actually happened. ... ); Damaka, supra note 16, at 301
("[T]ruth-conducive values cannot be an overriding consideration in legal proceedings: it is generally
recognized that several social needs and values exercise a constraining effect on attempts to achieve
fact-finding precision."). By some measures, the search for truth may seem futile--even
"misconceived, or quixotic." Id at 297 (adding that futility "is no argument against... effort").
191. Damagka, supra note 16, at 303.
192. Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1198-99 (1979) ("It is the function of the jury to produce an
acceptable, albeit artificial, resolution ... "); see Dama.ka, supra note 16, at 304; Kaplow, supra note
184, at 308 (noting that the question is one of achieving the right balance between accuracy and cost);
Nesson, supra note 190, at 1358; Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1376 (1971) ("It would be a terrible mistake to forget that a
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tends to come first. Most studies of procedure and evidence still begin where
Bentham, Thayer, and Wigmore did: with the distinctively "rationalist"
assumption that trial is, at bottom, a search for truth. 193 A first map of
information rules thus starts there too. 194
FIGURE 1: Adjudicative accuracy
AUTOMATIC SPOLIATION WORK PRODUCT PEREMPTORY BAR ONJUROR
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE CHALLENGES TESTIMONY
0 10Dominant Subordinate
This map is marked by two chronological themes. The first is broader and
more historically peculiar: newer information rules tend to lean more sharply
toward accuracy than older rules do. Automatic civil disclosure, for example,
postdates the bar on juror testimony by centuries. It also emerged long after
most scholars acknowledged real constraints on the law's pursuit of truth.'
95
But automatic disclosure still tilts toward truth more than its Rule 606(b)
analog-and more than tools like peremptory challenges too. The second theme
is more case-centric and familiar: accuracy's (reputed) peerlessness fades as
cases grow old. Truth seeking may begin as an unrivaled value, the driving
typical lawsuit, whether civil or criminal, is only in part an objective search for historical troth. It is
also, and no less importantly, a ritual."); see also Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of
Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEX. L. REV. 929, 944 (1983) (reviewing JULIUS B. LEVINE,
DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETwEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH
REFORM PROPOSALS (1982)) ("One especially skilled in instrumental reasoning can construct endless
links .. .for example, more discovery is good because it will produce more evidence, which will
produce more accuracy in fact-finding, which will mean better enforcement .. "); Frederick Schauer,
Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 699, 706 (1991) (fearing that
commentators too readily treat "truth [as] an ultimate, irreducible, and noninstrumental value").
193. See WILLIAM L. TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 71 (1990); Kaplow, supra note 184, at
307 ("[T]he value of more accurate adjudication is largely taken for granted."); Sanchirico, supra note
188, at 1228 ("Most evidence scholarship takes as given that trial is at its core a search for truth .... ").
194. A caution: My construction of all three maps is as tentative as it is deliberate-deliberate
in that it reflects a careful plotting of the rules' informational commitments, but tentative in that it
remains open to suggestion and change. As a start, my maps take the rules at their word-accepting
the notion that Rule 26(a) seeks cooperation, for example, and that Rule 606(b) promotes finality. But
this credulousness is not without consequence: It may elide the fact that some doctrines, like automatic
disclosure, deliver far less than they promise. See supra text accompanying note 70. And it may
confine our view to one perspective where it may be best served by two: Work product may seem less
committed to accuracy under a static lens, for example, because it allows attorneys to shield some
useful information that they have. But it may seem more committed to accuracy under a dynamic lens,
in turn, because it induces parties to do more of their own information-generating work. I return to
some of these themes and ideas. See infra Part I. But I acknowledge and attempt to attend to them
here.
195. The initial federal automatic disclosure provision took effect in 1993, supra Part 1, more
than a decade after Judge Frankel's call (for example) for a return to truth. See Frankel, supra note 24.
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impulse of automatic disclosure and spoliation rules.' 96 But other factors, like
efficiency and finality, gain influence as cases inch forward. Accuracy's map
thus confirms something both obvious and often elided: our information
architecture favors reaching "correct" outcomes-but it sometimes proves
indifferent to that pursuit.
A second commitment-to civil adversarialism-helps explain why.
American civil litigation functions by way of two-sided partisanship: plaintiffs
gather their own evidence, frame their own arguments, and advance their own
interests-and defendants do too.197 This distinctive mode of practice is not
necessarily hostile to accuracy. It is often defended, in fact, as a clear route to
accurate answers-a way for clashes between motivated partisans to uncover
legal truth.198 But legal reality is sometimes less romantic. Adversarial process
can invite, not ennobling conflict, but a kind of hardnosed "combat"-fights by
means of self-serving distortion and suppressed evidence. 199 Parties in these
fights seek victory, not accuracy. Attorneys serve clients, not justice. All the
while truth is left to "emerge" with "no one ... in charge of seeking it."
200
Yet some information rules still push against adversarialism's strong pull.
A second map shows at least two that do.
FIGURE 2: Civil adversarialism
WORK PRODUCT PEREMPTORY BAR ON SPOLIATION AUTOMATIC
DOCTRINE CHALLENGES JUROR TESTIMONY DISCLOSURE
igorous I Compelled)
Competition Cooperation
A first look at this map suggests something curious. It suggests that civil
adversarialism is both more and less than it seems: More because its clashes
follow varied blueprints-some with preset winners, others with slanting
196. See, e.g., DAVID PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND COUNSEL 9 (1954) (arguing
that identifying truth is the "sole objective of the judge").
197. See LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 8, 332.
198. 1d; see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 494, 505 (1986) (noting that the drafters of the Federal Rules had a "belief, fairly termed
'faith,' in adversarial exchanges as an adequate basis for adjudication, in adjudication as the essence of
fair decisionmaking"); cf William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and
Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 703, 716 (1989) ("[T]he dead hand of the adversary process
continues to rule civil litigation and holds the legal profession hostage.").
199. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 8, 332; see also Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge,
Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 261, 261-62 (1993) ("Many observers believe
that [our] approach allows lawyers to give far too much undesirable advice.").
200. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 8, 333.
201. Like work product protection of attorney mental impressions, which holds those
impressions off limits regardless of merit or need.
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fields. 202 Yet less because contemporary civil practice is not adversarial from
bottom to top. Modem civil process instead includes deliberately cooperative
devices-like spoliation and automatic civil disclosure. And it prohibits
outright deception, perhaps because such trickery produces information of little
203civil use.
A second look hints at something different. It hints at a pattern based on
the information's holder: Information held by attorneys and jurors seems more
likely to be shielded. Information held by parties appears more likely to be
exposed. Like many legal patterns, this one has exceptions-peremptory
challenge rules that purport to lay bare attorney strategy, privilege rules that
cloak party-held details.20 4 It also discounts the reality that attorneys and jurors,
not parties, sometimes hold a case's most pertinent facts. 205 But this pattern is
no less instructive for its inevitable gaps: if the kind of information at issue
often matters-fact or opinion, helpful or harmful-the holder of that
information may well matter too.
It may also matter if a party can afford a difficult fight. Today's civil
litigants enjoy uncommon informational power-to search out elusive
evidence, to subpoena unfriendly witnesses, to compel sworn testimony, to
gather tangible things. But these litigants also assume a heavy burden: they
must pay for the tools that they use.20 6 This "private" model of civil practice
fits well with adversarialism. It leaves litigation to the efforts of self-interested
parties, not to the investments of impassive courts. But this model also bestows
unequal advantage. It favors those with abundant resources-and hinders those
with comparatively few.
20 7
A third information commitment-to procedural equality-offers some
compromise. Equality in civil practice has long been burdened with grand
labels: "indispensable" to legal process, "necessary" to just adjudication, and
perhaps the "most important" feature of any procedural framework. 208 But
equality's promise still proves more rhetorical than real. Well-positioned
parties still begin (and end) litigation with easier access to relevant documents,
closer connections to persuasive witnesses, and deeper pockets to fund
sympathetic investigation. Skillful attorneys still deploy (and then bill for) their
202. Like peremptory challenge doctrine, which makes attorneys' reasons difficult, but not
impossible, to access.
203. See Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1904, 1912, 1914 (noting that criminal litigation is different).
204. Cf Cammack, supra note 15 (arguing that Rule 606(b) should operate as a privilege, not a
prohibition).
205. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 (1987).
206. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 694-95.
207. For a foundational discussion of the "wealth effect" in adversarial litigation, see
LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 1-2, 332-33.
208. Rubenstein, supra note 26, at 1866-67, 1906; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 46-57 (1976) (noting the values of utility,
dignity, equality, and tradition in procedural equality).
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superior fact-gathering guile. Modem trial practice thus offers information
equality of only a limited kind. It rations the type and quantity of discovery
tools available to each party. 20 9 And it gives every litigant the baseline capacity
to produce arguments and tender proof. A third map suggests how.
FIGURE 3: Procedural equality.
AUTOMATIC PEREMPTORY SPOLIATION BAR ON WORK PRODUCT
DISCLOSURE CHALLENGES JUROR TESTIMONY DOCTRINE
Enforced I Exploitable
Equality rI balance
One look at this map confirms something obvious: our system's pledge to
equality runs but part of the way. Some information rules, like the bar on juror
testimony, seem largely indifferent to questions of equal "equipage." 210 And
others, like work product doctrine, push firmly against party equivalence-
inhibiting rival free riding, endorsing lawyerly industry, and carving out gaps
for able advocates to exploit.
But still other rules close more gaps than they open. Spoliation rules, for
example, demand that adversaries preserve evidence helpful only to their
opponents, not just after a lawsuit commences, but even before a case starts.
Automatic disclosure compels parties to divulge supporting data, to itemize
useful evidence, and to forego much hope of last-ditch surprise. And
peremptory challenge doctrine constrains lawyerly cunning, roots out illicit
motives, and (like automatic disclosure) sheds faint light on a party's trial
strategy. So though the civil process still tolerates many kinds of information
inequality, it aspires to something different. It aspires to "equaliz[e] the
information available to each side. 21 1
The reason for this is far from abstract. Our system's commitment to
equalized information does not grow from some inchoate faith in equality for
its own sake. Nor is it an attempt to break down entrenched structures of wealth
212
and power, those "caste-like" layers so resistant to redistributive rules. It is
instead an instrumental means to a now-familiar end: equally informed litigants
209. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P, 30(a)(2) (giving each party a maximum often depositions, absent
court leave).
210. Rubenstein, supra note 26, at 1873-78. 1 recognize, as Professors Mashaw and Rubenstein
counsel, that equality is a "notoriously slippery concept." Id. at 1866 (citing Jerry L. Mashaw,
Administrative Due Process. The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 899 (1981)). I do
not mean to ignore that slipperiness here. I mean instead to consider how our rules prompt or prevent a
particular kind of equality-namely that of case-pertinent information. Id. at 1866 n.9 ("I label this the
concern of 'equipage' equality because what we are worried about is whether parties are equally
equipped' to engage in adversarial adjudicatory procedures."). I leave the rest of the concept alone.
211. Id. at 1880.
212. Id at 1886.
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are thought to wage the most vigorous adversarial battles. And the most
vigorous adversarial -battles are thought to produce the most accurate and
acceptable results. 2 13 Our information architecture values equality less for what
it is, then, than for what it does.
And so here, by fluke or by fashion, three disparate commitments fall
haltingly in line. Accurate judgments rely on fervent adversarialism. Fervent
adversarialism profits from equalized information. Equalized information thus
hooks back to adjudicative accuracy-and the legitimacy of legal outcomes
comes to depend on all three.2 14
This is not, of course, legitimacy of an unqualified kind. It is instead a
specific type of adjudicative legitimacy-what Professor Fallon might call
legal-sociological legitimacy-that both comports with legal norms and
maintains public support. 2 5 Individual decisions may still prove lacking, both
practically and epistemologically; they may still, that is, be wrong. 2 16 But our
information architecture locates legitimacy more in process and in packaging
than in particular results. It prescribes a process that offers strong (early)
assurances of access and availability, of evidence carefully safeguarded and
information fully disclosed. And it packages its decisions in "impenetrable"
boxes, inscrutable verdicts sealing both blemish and uncertainty inside the jury
room's "black hole." 2 17 This, then, is a strange (even ironic) brand of
legitimacy. Civil adversarialism works, not by way of unfettered self-interest,
but through tempered cooperation and partial equality. Pretrial openness
balances postverdict secrets. And still, almost without exception, the system
generates judgments that a public will accept.
21 8
C. A Typology
A careful study of civil information could well end there. More examples
might be added-about propensity evidence and physical examinations, about
oral depositions and spousal privileges. But these additions would only
213. Seeid. at 1881.
214. See id. at 1886 ("Equality is important... because it is thought to contribute to an efficient
and legitimate resolution of legal controversies."). In this sense, equality and adversarialism may seem
like instrumental means to accurate legal ends.
215. See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1794-96. I leave aside what Professor Fallon calls "moral"
legitimacy-legitimacy, that is, rooted in a legal enactment's moral justification. Id. at 1796. My
argument is thus distinctly (if indifferently) positivist, for it "assumes that an enactment can count as
law despite serious moral defects." Id. at 1801; cf ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt.
11-l, Q. 95, Art. 2, Objection 4, reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN,
JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166 (1995) (claiming that an
unjust law is "no law at all").
216. Fallon, supranote 27, at1817-18, 1851.
217. Fisher, supra note 10, at 705-09.
218. See id. at 580 n.8 ("When I speak of... legitimacy, I mean only... mak[ing] the system's
judgments acceptable to the public and.., packaged.., in a way.., the public would accept."); see
also TYLER, supra note 162 (arguing that people accept judgments based on the way they were
made-that is, on their procedural justice).
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reinforce a now-established theme: our information system's commitments are
both real and elastic. And so that system aims, by coordination and concession,
to be many things at once.
To this point, I have taken the rules within this system largely as we find
them: as a scattered collection of provisions and prohibitions, set in formal rule
structures and common law comers, interacting and overlapping outside any
rigorous typology. This Part proposes one such typology. 219 It divides
information rules into four basic categories-valid information, invalid
information, valid misinformation, and invalid misinformation-and offers
220introductory examples of each. My hope, as before, is not that these
classifications will mark a singularly seamless way to understand all civil
information. My hope is rather that this careful and creative typology will do
two no-less-valuable things: It will reveal, for one, how our commitments to
accuracy, adversarialism, and equality operate within a shared architecture-
what pieces fit together, where they splinter, and why they do. And it will raise,
for another, the core question at the heart of that architecture: Do our rules
successfully manage (in)valid (mis)information-and the behavior of legal
actors too?
TABLE 1: (In)valid (mis)information-Definitions
Information Misinformation
Valid Authentic Inauthentic
• Appropriate for • Appropriate for
consideration consideration
Invalid * Authentic Inauthentic
• Inappropriate for Inappropriate for
consideration consideration
A first group in this typology concerns valid information. It is
"information" (in this sense) because it is genuine and reliable, not dubious or
deceptive. And it is "valid" (in this sense) because it is appropriate, and perhaps
even necessary, for inclusion in the litigation process---even at a sizeable
219. I use the term typology, not taxonomy, because mine is a conceptual effort, not an
exhaustive empirical one. See KENNETH D. BAILEY, TYPOLOGIES AND TAXONOMIES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES 4-6 (1994). And even by this laxer standard, my
effort is self-consciously modest: my categories do not aim to displace all others, nor are they entirely
mutually exclusive. See id. at 3.
220. Here and elsewhere, I use the term "information" in an admittedly but justifiably broad
way. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. And I use the term "valid" to suggest that the
information is pertinent to some legal process broadly defined, not just to a jury's deliberation at trial.
Some of that valid information will be admissible, of course, but not all will: information automatically
disclosed is valid, for example, but not always admissible.
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cost. 2 2 1 Valid information thus includes rules like automatic disclosure and the
own-statement provision of work product doctrine, both of which ensure that
certain facts are accessible easily or without request. A careful attorney's roster
of friendly witnesses is thus valid information. So too are a potential witness's
own words.222
But a juror's account of quarrelsome, angry, or even drug-addled
deliberation is notably not. That account fits instead into a second category:
invalid information. Like the category before it, this one involves information
that is genuine and reliable, not deceptive or doubtful. But this information is
inappropriate for legal consideration, despite its authenticity. Invalid
information thus includes rules like the bar on juror testimony and the attorney-
thought prohibition of work product doctrine, both of which put potentially
instructive information out of legal sight. A loose-lipped juror's truthful tale of
jury misbehavior is thus off-limits as invalid information. So too is a document
that summarizes an attorney's opinions and strategic plans.
A third group concerns almost precisely the opposite. It concerns valid
misinformation: "misinformation" because it comprises inauthentic evidence-
fakes or feints or fissures where information once was; but "valid" because it is
appropriate for inclusion in litigation all the same. Valid misinformation thus
includes the adverse inference sanction for sins of spoliation223 and the courts'
credulous acceptance of peremptory challenge pretext, both of which sustain
information lacking legitimate anchor. An order to assume a fact that lacks
evidentiary backing is thus valid misinformation. So too is a convincing-but-
dishonest story that a peremptory challenge was used because of a lawful, if
ineffable, hunch.
But if this third category covers some successful dishonesty, it excludes
the knowing destruction of pertinent evidence. That kind of deception fits
instead into a fourth-and final-novel category: invalid misinformation. Like
the third group before it, this category involves fakes, feints, and fissures, not
authentic evidence. But here such misinformation is unsuited for consideration
in the litigation process. Invalid misinformation thus includes the core of
spoliation doctrine and the courts' rejection of peremptory challenge pretext,
both of which seek to erase the value of self-serving lies. A corporation's
intentional destruction of disturbing email is thus invalid misinformation, 224 as
is an attorney's unconvincing explanation of an unlawful peremptory strike.
221. See Bell et al., supra note 62, at 46 (observing that automatic disclosure undermines the
adversarial process).
222. Other rules-like Federal Rules of Evidence 802 and 403-may still exclude those words
from consideration at trial.
223. The same may be true of parts of pleading doctrine. See FED. R. Crv. P. 8(b)(6)
(explaining that even untrue facts may be taken as admitted if not properly denied).
224. Or perhaps makes it invalid misinformation.
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Each kind of civil information thus fits an "(in)valid (mis)information"
category. And each category offers a new way to consider-and a new
vocabulary for discussing--civil information more generally.
TABLE 2: (In)valid (mis)information-Examples
Information Misinformation
Valid - Automatic disclosure - Spoliation
- Work product doctrine (adverse inference)
(own statement) * Peremptory challenges
(successful pretext)
Invalid ° Bar on juror testimony ° Spoliation
- Work product doctrine (destruction)
(attorney thoughts) ° Peremptory challenges
(unsuccessful pretext)
But what this typology captures is more textured than transformative. It
aims less to alter how litigation operates than to encourage a more nuanced
understanding of our set of information rules.
A single comparison captures much of this subtlety. It also shows how the
"(in)valid (mis)information" typology links similar pieces usefully together
while keeping disparate rules helpfully apart. The comparison considers two
now-familiar concepts: automatic disclosure under Rule 26(a) and the adverse
inference sanction under spoliation doctrine. The two are akin in important
measure: Both involve facts or things deemed appropriate for legal
consideration. Both reach information that will influence, if not determine, a
225case's outcome. But the two should not be lumped hastily together, nor
should they be grouped under the vague and misleading banner of "usable
things." The two rules, for one, derive from dissimilar instincts-automatic
disclosure a commitment to truth through collaborative enterprise, adverse
inferences an urge to punish informational misdeeds. And the two rules, for
another, involve different facts and data-automatic disclosure a batch of real
and verifiable items, adverse inferences a kind of fiction sustained by judicial
decree. It makes better sense, then, to say that one rule involves valid
information while the other involves a type of valid misinformation. And it
makes better sense too to trace this interdoctrinal variation, to spot this
structural nuance, and to highlight the details of a cautious design.
Even in its caution, of course, that design does something difficult. It
processes and prioritizes an entire universe of information-facts and opinions,
secrets and lies. It fills a set of longstanding commitments with legal content-
225. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("In




accuracy in the form of shared disclosures, adversarialism in the guise of
hidden thoughts. And it records where a system's diligent attention gives way
to blind eyes.
But this design asks an unanswered question too: Does what we are
learning about human "Information Behavior" correspond with what we know
about our legal rules? The (in)valid (mis)information typology may tie together
our system's commitments, chart our doctrinal choices, and clarify by way of
new category. But it does not tally legal successes. It does not ask how those
who use, operate, and so often depend on civil litigation make sense of our
information rules. Part III frames a first response to those questions. And it
roots its search for answers in an approach rather new.
III.
INFORMATION BEHAVIOR
Civil litigation is a study in information behavior. There as much as
anywhere, in the clash of legal adversaries, information conduct follows
customary form: parties gather facts to narrow "gap[s] in [their] knowledge";
courts receive data in stylized bundles; juries deliver verdicts omitting details
22that others wish to avoid. 26 The stakes in these suits can be high, the skills
deployed extraordinary. But the shape of these disputes is resilient at its core: in
cases big and small, outcomes follow facts. Attorneys are both legal experts
and "information engineers."
227
Not long ago, a group of scholars set out to explore information conduct
of a similar kind. They did not begin their study in courtrooms, in the offices of
litigators, or in the law at all. They started instead in the quiet confines of
228
science libraries and along the high-tech pathways of the worldwide web.
What has grown from this initial exploration is the field of "information
behavior," a discipline its practitioners often call "B.
' 2 29
This Part links IB to the (legal) information architecture detailed in Parts I
and II. It aims, originally if provisionally, to initiate a process of deeper LB-law
engagement, to relate that process to more familiar legal research, 23 and to
outline this legal dialogue's enduring contours. To date, IB and law have
touched only at the margins. This Part thus considers what IB can learn from
226. CASE, supra note 18, at 5; see also Sunderland, supra note 131, at 262 ("[T]he law puts
the general verdict out of sight and then, because no flaws appear in it, the conclusive presumption is
indulged that no flaws exist.").
227. Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REv. 565, 632 (2006).
228. See T.D. Wilson, Human Information Behavior, 3 INFORMING SCI. 49-53 (2000).
229. THEORIES, supra note 17; CASE, supra note 18.
230. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (describing how
behavioral economics provides insights into legal decision making); Simon, supra note 18 (explaining
the connections between "coherence-based" decision making and legal decision making).
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the behavior of legal actors-and where our information architecture might
benefit from the lessons of [B too.
Part III.A introduces the history, scope, and abiding lessons of IB. My aim
here is not to itemize every subtle facet of IB scholarship. Nor do I mean to
stake out any particular normative claim. I hope instead to present IB as a
source of novel insight, a place to learn new and useful things about the law's
information design. Part III.B concentrates in turn on three core IB principles-
the principle of least effort, the threatening nature of knowledge, and the
minefield of misestimation-paying careful attention to our information
architecture, its information rules, and the story of the corporation, the careful
attorney, and the loose-lipped juror too. Part III.C then sounds a pessimistic
caution and an optimistic call, asking where our legal information system may
fall short of IB's standards-as well as where it may already exceed them.
A. IB
In 1948, a Royal Society Conference posed an alluring question. It asked
"how people used information in relation to their work.",23' The query was not
new, even then, but the call for an answer may have seemed particularly acute.
Faced with a post-war boom in scientific literature, everyone from casual
readers to academic specialists (and their dutiful librarians) met unprecedented
challenges of information access, source, and scope.
The first studies to address these challenges were deliberately narrow.
Early IB work considered how medical scientists engaged specific information
systems and how atomic engineers retrieved particular documents-not how
people made sense of their wider information world.232 But in the decades that
followed, IB research grew in focus and in form. Introductory questions about
scientific "information-seeking" blossomed into richer explorations of human
"information needs." 233 Preliminary forays into IB theory gave way to more
expansive (and contentious) conceptual frameworks. 234 And initial attention to
library stacks and card catalogs spread to more critical engagements with the
lessons of social science and the insights of cognitive psychology. 235 This
striking expansion enlivened and diversified IB analysis, transforming a
specialist's inquiry into a wholesale examination of "information use." It also
made IB's challenges more difficult: New sources of information only added
analytical complexity. New technologies only complicated matters of access
and scope.
231. Wilson, supra note 228, at 50.
232. See id.
233. Id at50-51.
234. See, e.g., Brenda Dervin, What Methodology Does to Theory: Sense-Making Methodology
as Exemplar, in THEORIES, supra note 17, at 25-29 (proposing a "sense-making methodology" to
reconcile two antecedent notions of EB theory).
235. See Wilson, supra note 228, at 52.
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Current IB scholarship reflects this growing, persistent, and sometimes
vexing diversity. It includes scholars tracing the process of information "sense-
making," a theory that takes information as internally "constructed" rather than
externally imposed. 236 It features scientists exploring fertile "information
grounds," those "synergistic" (and often temporary) environments in which
people exchange information largely by chance. 237 And it prompts reviews of
best information practices, including preliminary reports of "almost formulaic
devices" that might "stimulate lawyers" (and others) to consider how
"information [might best] be used.,
2 38
Amid this IB variety are some intriguing disagreements. IB scholars
differ, for example, in the way they group information concepts-some
dividing among information's "environmental," "internal," and "social"
representations; others splitting between "information-as-process,"
"information-as-knowledge," and "information-as-thing." 239  IB scholars
diverge too on the nuances of information acquisition-some contending that
240acquisition occurs through discrete stage-based processes, 0 others suggesting
that acquisition involves a set of interactive tasks (like "browsing" and
"extracting") that depend heavily on context and time. 241 And IB scholars also
dispute the connection between truth and information-some believing that
information must be "truthlike" to "fit" any useful definition, others claiming
242
that true-false questions are immaterial to IB's chief concerns.
Yet despite this debate and diversity, modem IB scholarship still imparts a
set of shared ideas. One is that people prefer information ease to information
quality-that they choose less useful but more accessible information over
243
higher value facts that are harder to find. Another is that new information
can be disconcerting and disorienting, so much so that acquiring new
knowledge can itself prove threatening.2 44 And a third is that people tend to
misestimate the value of information-sometimes overestimating the value of
facts recently gathered, sometimes underestimating the worth of things they do
not know. 245
The Section that follows looks carefully at these three 1B principles, both
as abstract information concepts and as sources of legal inquiry. As it does, it
calls again on the rules and stories outlined above. But Part III.B calls on more
236. See, e.g.,CASE, supra note 18, at 158.
237. Karen E. Fisher, Information Grounds, in THEORIES, supra note 17, at 185.
238. CASE, supra note 18, at 279 (recounting the work of Cole and Kuhlthau).
239. Id. at 43-44 (comparing the approaches of Brent Ruben and Michael Buckland).
240. See, e.g., Carol Collier Kuhlthau, Kuhlthau's Information Search Process, in THEORIES,
supra note 17, at 230-34.
241. David Ellis, Ellis's Model of Information-Seeking Behavior, in THEORIES, supra note 17,
at 138-39.
242. CASE, supra note 18, at 59-60.
243. See id. at 151; Bates, supra note 31, at4.
244. See Bates, supra note 31, at 5.
245. See id at 4-5; CASE, supra note 18, at 97-100.
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than that too. It calls in particular on the cognitive decision making work of
scholars already firmly rooted in the law. For IB offers more than new
perspective on familiar legal doctrines. It offers a chance to refine an already
vigorous engagement with judges, jurors, and legal decision making too.
A related proviso: 1B may tell us little about attorneys even as it tells us
much about the law. IB can shed new light on the law's information
architecture. It can reveal how certain rules might fit together and when core
commitments may peel apart. But IB may also pass over some of the most
insistent pressures that lawyers face-to boost their billable hours, to meet their
clients' wishes, and to burnish their professional reputations. What follows thus
aims at something more general than specific: it asks, that is, only what IB may
teach us about our system of information rules. But it acknowledges that
individual lawyers, as information actors, may be different too.
B. Three Themes
1. The Principle of Least Effort
At the core of IB theory is a seed of bare complacence: information
seekers expend as little effort as they can. Given a choice between low-value-
but-easily-accessible information and high-value-but-harder-to-find substitutes,
people pick low value time and again.246 And the easier the access, it seems,
the simpler the choice.
247
This is the principle of least effort, perhaps the "most solid" lesson in all
of IB.248 Pioneered by linguist George Zipf, the principle of least effort reaches
all manner of human conduct-from word choice and web searches to citation
patterns and tool selection. 249 It recalls key concepts of social cognition-like
the notion that "mere exposure" to information can shape individual
246. See Bates, supra note 31, at 4; CASE, supra note 18, at 51. A key caveat: I am not
claiming that people always pick a path of least resistance, whether in information settings or outside
of them. Any lawyer made to comb through piles of redundant documents, to search endless email, or
to Shepardize endless cases knows just the opposite. I mean instead only to set an anchor for this
introduction of [B.
247. See CASE, supra note 18, at 51.
248. Bates, supra note 31, at 4.
249. CASE, supra note 18, at 151-53. Zipf was more than a linguist. He was a University
Lecturer at Harvard with a wide-ranging curiosity. His least-effort theory derived in part from what he
called "harmonic distributions," patterns of use and nonuse detectable in every manner of human
conduct-including word choice in famous fiction. In Ulysses, for example, Zipf noted that the 10th
most common word appeared 2653 times, the 100th most common 265 times, and the 1000th most
common only 26 times. ZIPF, supra note 30, at 23-51. To Zipf, this was more than stylistic
coincidence. It was "clear evidence of the existence of a vocabulary balance"-and a harmonic
distribution-among the novel's 29,899 different (and 260,430 total) words. Id. at 23-24.
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preference 250 and the idea that "resistance" to contrary sentiments increases
attitude certainty. 251 And it sheds light on at least three information rules.
One is work product doctrine. As the pages above recount, work product
doctrine grows in part from an aversion to free riding-a sense that even
motivated attorneys will sometimes choose indolent piggybacking over more
strenuous work. Fears of abuse, concerns about lawyer morale, and worries
about proprietary interests also inform work product doctrine, as does a special
solicitude for adversarial self-interest. 252 But work product doctrine both
reflects and restrains what the principle implies: a lawyer may well opt for
easily-available-but-lesser-value information wherever she can.253  A
corporation's counsel, for example, may rely on the efforts of her more active
legal adversary, even if more useful information could be found through more
vigorous independent work. Work product doctrine thus puts the active
attorney's efforts partly off-limits, demanding effort from her opponent where
she may be otherwise inclined to rest.
But not all of the careful attorney's efforts are inaccessible to others. Far
more of her work may be subject to automatic disclosure, a doctrine the
principle of least effort frames quite differently. Automatic disclosure, to recall,
mandates the sharing of many kinds of favorable information-names of
friendly witnesses, copies of helpful things.254 The aim of this doctrine is not to
induce legal laziness but to increase adjudicative accuracy, to ensure
information equality, and to reduce litigation surprise. Yet this doctrine also has
its hazards. One is confused adversarialism-a careful attorney compelled to do
some of her opponent's work. 255 And another may be informational idleness-
a corporation all too content with its adversary's facts.256 Unlike work product
doctrine, then, automatic disclosure seems to accept and accede to our least
effort instincts, excusing (even inviting) the corporation to coast in part on the
careful attorney's work. But this acceptance reflects the principle too. It
acknowledges that attorneys may not always dig deeply enough to anchor
250. ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 283-84 (1999).
251. Zakary L. Tormala & Richard E. Petty, What Doesn't Kill Me Makes Me Stronger: The
Effects of Resisting Persuasion on Attitude Certainty, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1298
(2002).
252. See supra Part I.
253. I ignore, for now, the perverse incentives of hourly billing practices-an incentive that
may, I recognize, turn many least effort instincts on their head.
254. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a).
255. See Bell et al., supra note 62, at 46 (noting the ethical strain that could accompany
automatic disclosure).
256. This risk may well have diminished since Rule 26(a)'s most recent substantive
amendment. Before that amendment, parties were required to disclose "relevant" information, not just
information "in support of' their defenses or claims. Now parties need only disclose information that
supports their arguments-at least automatically. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). Unfavorable information may
still be revealed by other discovery means, but the shift in automatic disclosure may itself be
significant: it may make it harder (or less likely) for one party to coast on the initial disclosures of
another.
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effective litigation. So automatic disclosure compels partial cooperation-a
kind of mutual free riding that aims to improve judicial results.
A third rule-spoliation-links to least effort more directly than that. And
it implicates another IB lesson as well: in a world rife with intangible data,
257people still favor more tangible things. Spoliation, once more, is a kind of
cheating: it is the suppression, alteration, or destruction of evidence relevant to
a pending or impending case. Limits on spoliation do not grow from any
sophisticated sense of litigant lassitude. They grow instead from a desire for
accurate outcomes and repugnance for party deceit. But that deceit confirms the
principle no less powerfully: suppressing evidence may be the quickest path to
victory. It may be easier, that is, for the corporation to destroy a former
employee's evidence than to build a case of its own. Spoliation rules thus
acknowledge and answer the principle of least effort. By limiting an easy form
of cheating, they may promote greater information diligence.
258
Not that this diligence proceeds by information rule alone. Hourly
compensation, client expectation, and professional reputation may also inspire
greater information effort. 25 9 But the principle of least effort helps link IB and
law together, not merely by abstract theory, but by connection to an array of
(in)valid (mis)information rules. Even more, this principle holds the promise of
enriched understanding and the power of more thoughtful rule-based change. A
second IB principle-the threatening nature of knowledge--does too.
2. The Threatening Nature of Knowledge
There is a risk in collecting new information: those who see it may not
like what they learn.260 A corporation hoping to tar a former employee as
litigious, for example, may hunt for new facts to confirm that opinion-and feel
relief when it finds them. A juror may think those same facts enlightening, if
not exactly pertinent. But the sullied employee may find those facts distressing
and small minded-and perhaps even "threatening to [her] sense of self.",
261
Such is the threatening nature of knowledge, another primary lesson of IB.
Built on the work of Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, the threatening
nature grows from a distinction between "value-seeking" and "information-
seeking"-the first a practice of finding facts to "match" preset agendas, the
second a less-programmed process of fact-acquisition. 262 Like the principle of
least effort, the threatening nature of knowledge comports with recent studies in
257. See Bates, supra note 31, at 5.
258. SeesupraPartl.
259. See, e.g., Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3; Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 199; Galanter,
supra note 151; Stuntz, supra note 25.
260. See Bates, supra note 31, at 5.
261. Id; see also CASE, supra note 18, at 97-100.
262. Bates, supra note 31, at 5.
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social cognition-about how we seek to reduce cognitive dissonance, 26 about
how we try to avoid unwanted data, 264 and about how we search for evidence
in hypothesis-confirming (i.e., "biased") ways. 265 And like the principle of least
effort, the threatening nature of knowledge connects to three (or more)
information rules.
The most obvious is Rule 606(b). Rule 606(b), to recall, prohibits jurors
from testifying about their deliberative processes-about nearly everything,
that is, internal to the jury's black box. Explanations for this bar include a
preference for robust jury discourse, an interest in case finality, and a desire to
shield jurors from postverdict harassment. But Rule 606(b) rests on threatening
nature grounds too: Rule 606(b) shuts the system's ears to facts it prefers not to
hear. A loose-lipped juror, for example, can tell anyone who will listen that his
jury based its decision on a crucial but correctible error. He may even reveal
that his jury would now find the opposite way. But federal courts will still
refuse to hear him. Rule 606(b) thus keeps this "shallow secret, ' 266 and by
avoiding threatening knowledge, a system maintains its certainty.
267
Peremptory challenge law may do something similar. But here threatening
facts retreat, not behind a formal rule of evidence, but into a burden-shifting
mess. Peremptory challenges, again, permit parties to strike prospective jurors
without first providing cause or reason. Only after a prima facie showing of
impermissible use must a party explain her peremptory practice, and even then
the thinnest rationalizations tend to work. Supporters of peremptories say these
strikes still educate the public, enhance the appearance of fairness, and enable
skillful attorneys to act on ineffable hunch. But peremptory practice may serve
a less noble function too: it may hide information that would otherwise
discomfit, disguising guesses that grow unspeakable biases and crude group
268stereotypes. A corporation, for example, can bury its strategy to eliminate all
women from a jury pool beneath a primary screen of "no reasons" and, if
necessary, a range of thinly convincing lies. 269 Here a process meant to root out
unsettling information comes instead to conceal it. Here courts and parties
263. See Thomas R. Shultz & Mark R. Lepper, Cognitive Dissonance Reduction as Constraint
Satisfaction, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 219 (1996).
264. CASE, supra note 18, at 97-100.
265. KUNDA, supra note 250, at 115; see also id. at 148 ("People are more upset by negative
outcomes when these result from exceptional behavior than they are when the identical outcomes
result from routine behavior.").
266. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON
LAW 21, 76 (1988) (defining a shallow secret as one that only partly hides-that leaves the secret's
target with "at least some shadowy sense" that she is missing pertinent information).
267. See Fisher, supra note 10; see also BOWKER & STAR, supra note 23, at 320 ("Black boxes
are necessary, and not necessarily evil."); Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How
Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judgments, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 122, 122 (1996).
268. See Babcock, supra note 107, at 544.
269. For a thoroughgoing account of lies in both public and private settings, see SISSELA BOK,
LYING: MORAL CHOICE N PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
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participate in another "shallow secret. ' 270 And here threatening knowledge is
avoided all the same.
Spoliation captures the threatening nature of knowledge from the opposite
side. It concentrates on tampering, not avoidance---on steps litigants take to
purge unwelcome information, not on screens that conceal facts we might
otherwise find. Spoliation rules prevent a corporation, for example, from
destroying a damning set of email and from erasing unfavorable data, not from
ignoring employees' work-related complaints. Yet if this reaction is
importantly different, the threatening lesson is largely unchanged: Information
can discomfit because new facts surprise and disorient. Or it can discomfit
because known facts put parties at risk.271 Rule 606(b) demands that the courts
turn deaf ears to new-and-threatening facts when they emerge from the jury.
Spoliation rules demand the preservation of known-but-risky facts within party
control. In both contexts the knowledge is threatening. And in both contexts the
threatening knowledge notion sheds light on the reach and reasons of an
information rule.
Like the principle of least effort, of course, the threatening nature of
knowledge remains only a theory. And like all theories its insights carry only so
far. The threatening nature of knowledge says little about certain portions of
our information architecture-like the own-statement provision of work
272product doctrine. And it offers but one way to assess a wide range of
information rules. But the aim of this enterprise is not to suggest that any
tentative IB theory can, or should, displace related claims about the impact of
cognitive dissonance, the practice of information avoidance, or the notion that
we search for facts in hypothesis-confirming ways. The aim is instead to
support those studies with a novel 1B toolset-and, in the process, to rethink a
batch of longstanding rules. The threatening nature of knowledge does this. So
too does the minefield of misestimation, a third and final IB theory.
3. The Minefield of Misestimation
Information may be what people make of it. But what people make of it
can often be quite wrong. People overestimate the value of things they know.
2 73
270. SCHEPPELE, supra note 266, at 21.
271. See Bates, supra note 31, at 5.
272. Even more, rules like automatic disclosure may cut the opposite way, forcing parties to
confront-and perhaps carefully engage-information that seems threatening. At this juncture, then,
the law-1B link may seem to break apart. But I do not pretend that each 1B theme explains every
information rule. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 737 ("[A]ny sentence that begins 'The
goal of X is...' [is] either vacuous or demonstrably false."); see also ZIPF, supra note 30, at ix ("[Olur
theory... does not claim either that no other theory can be found that will also rationalize our data, or
that no other data will ever be found that do not controvert our theory."). Nor do I claim that any
partial theory can (or will) explain the whole. I claim only that 1B may teach us something useful about
our information system. And I argue only that the threatening nature sheds light on some information
rules.
273. Bates, supra note 31, at 5.
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They underestimate the value of things they do not know.2 74 They struggle to
imagine what unknown information might look like, and they "underinvest" in
searching for it too.275 In this sense, information is more than a "complicated
business. ' 276 It is a lasting source of cognitive hiccup and a minefield of
misestimation.
That minefield is hardly exclusive IB terrain. Of the three TB themes
detailed here, in fact, the minefield of misestimation seems most tightly joined
to work done elsewhere: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have described
the sway of heuristics on human decision making, the variety of biases that
distort human judgment, and the role of uncertainty in Prospect Theory. 277 Ziva
Kunda has summarized the ways that "expectancies" ex ante influence
recollections ex post.278 And Dan Simon has outlined two standard conceptions
279of legal decision making-and then crafted his own nuanced third.
Conventional models of legal decision making, Simon notes, split
between the "Rationalist" and the "Critical"-the first seeing legal decision
making as logical, Bayesian, and forward-moving, "strictly" tracking
inferences built on "deductions, inductions, and analogies"; 280 the second
casting legal decision making as intuitive, Realist, and erratic, driven by
experience, expedience, and "the felt necessities of the time. ' 2s 1 Simon's
alternative-what he calls "coherence-based reasoning"-takes a different
282tack. It suggests that people respond to "complex and difficult decision
tasks," not by confronting them directly, but by unconsciously "reconstructing
them" as "easy" calls. 283 Central to this "coherence-based" view is its
acceptance of "bidirectionality"-its recognition that decision makers employ
both forward-focused (Rationalist) logic and backward-glancing (Critical)
274. Id
275. See CASE, supra note 18, at 154 (noting that some people are "oversensitive to the costs
involved in acquiring information and undersensitive to issues of information quality").
276. Craswell, supra note 227, at 631.
277. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judging Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
278. KUNDA, supra note 250, at 162.
279. See Simon, supra note 18.
280. Id. at 511-15. For a terrific and accessible discussion of Bayesian analysis-as well as its
critics-see Friedman, supra note 19, at 2041-44. Bayesian skeptics, Professor Friedman notes, frame
Bayesian analysis as "algorithmic," a "mechanical" process by which fact finders "ingest and digest
the evidence one elemental piece at a time-byte by byte, so to speak-and update its probability
estimates with each new ingestion." Id. But these "Bayesioskeptics," Friedman claims, overstate their
criticisms and undervalue Bayesian tools. Nothing "requires" the assumption that Bayesian analysis
proceeds "byte by byte," Friedman argues. Even more, in evidence law, Bayes may provide a
"virtually inevitable tool." Id. at 2043-44.
281. See Simon, supra note 18, at 511-15 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMONLAW 1 (1881)).
282. Id at 512-13.
283. Id
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intuition.284 And central to this "coherence-based" view is the existence of
"coherence shifts"-those mostly unconscious changes in a decision maker's
mindset that steer her away from ambiguity and "toward conformity." 285 Hard
decisions here are reflexively transformed into "seemingly straightforward"
choices, clear-cut judgments that a person can make with confidence and
strength.286 Our loose-lipped juror does something different than compile and
compare contradictory data. He "morphs" hard questions into easy ones,
"shifts" unconsciously toward a set of simple answers, and filters evidence to
support a conclusion he has already reached.287
Similar patterns have been discussed in other places. Simon himself has
explored "constraint satisfaction," the idea that "the mind shuns incoherent
representations and constructs coherent ones in their place." 288 Reid Hastie and
Nancy Pennington have developed the "Story Model" of jury decision making,
a theory suggesting that jurors build (internal) narrative structures and then
organize evidence to fit those preset frames. 289 And Thomas Shultz and Mark
Lepper have explained how reductions in cognitive dissonance help instill a
potent (if inaccurate) sense of mental consistency.
290
1B scholars have recorded something similar. They have charted a natural
"drift toward" friendly data-a tendency to seek and consume a "diet of
information that is mostly congruent with our [preset] beliefs., 291 These drifts
and diets owe a debt to other disciplines, for they echo parts of what others
284. Id. at 515-16. Put slightly differently, new evidence can influence preset conclusions, and
preset conclusions can influence perceptions of new evidence. See Dan Simon et al., The Redux of
Cognitive Consistency Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 814, 814 (2004) (deeming "bidirectionality ... strongly inconsistent with ...
Bayesian models").
285. Simon, supra note 18, at 516-18.
286. Id. at 513,516-18.
287. Id. at 517, 524-28.
288. See Simon et al., supra note 284, at 816.
289. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE
THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192-221 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) ("The
essence of this theory is that the construction of a causal model of events, a story, is central in
understanding the evidence and its implications."); see also Kenworthey Bilz, We Don't Want to Hear
It: Psychology, Literature and the Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 429. On this note,
of course, Jennifer Robbenholt, John Darley, and Robert MacCoun sound a useful reminder: "[J]urors
and other finders-of-fact ... ought to be thought of as pursuing many different goals simultaneously."
Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision
Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (2003).
290. Shultz & Lepper, supra note 263, at 220; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE POET
AT THE BREAKFAST-TABLE: His TALKS WITH His FELLOW-BOARDERS AND THE READER 344 (1872)
("The very minute a thought is threatened with publicity it seems to shrink towards mediocrity .... );
Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted
Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117-18 (1994) ("[B]ecause of a
lack of awareness of mental processes, the limitations of mental control, and the difficulty of detecting
bias, it is often very difficult to avoid or undo mental contamination.").
291. CASE, supra note 18, at 98.
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292have said before. But IB's lessons are no less instructive for their roots in
other places. And the minefield of misestimation is no less promising for its
cross-cutting support. People do overestimate the value of things they know,
underestimate the value of things they do not know, struggle to picture
unknown information, and "under-invest" in searching for it too. 293 The
minefield of misestimation thus runs straight through the rarified world of legal
decision making. It also sheds light on many information rules.
One such rule is automatic disclosure. More than any other information
rule, in fact, automatic disclosure may unseat misestimation at its core. Civil
parties, like ordinary people, are prone to misestimation: they overvalue facts
they have gathered and underestimate the strength of contrary claims.
294
Automatic disclosure confronts this misestimation bluntly and quickly. It forces
parties to reveal facts they deem favorable and to face unfavorable data they
might not have otherwise sought. Even more, it does so early in litigation,
perhaps before parties embed their misestimations too deeply and the allure of
295their misimpressions grows too strong. A principal, if controversial,
advantage of this process may be a confluence of party expectation: the
corporation and the aggrieved employee, for example, may inch closer to
settlement as their understandings of the facts converge. 96 Another benefit
may be better-informed counsel, even at the cost of some ethical strain. And-
though stubborn parties may get stuck in the minefield, automatic disclosure
puts their self-delusion to good use. It permits litigants to drift toward favorable
information-but also compels them to consider their adversaries' best facts. It
pits misestimation against misestimation in the hope of improved legal
results. 297
Rule 606(b) leverages misestimation in a different way. It discounts rather
than discloses. It tells federal courts to ignore almost everything a juror might
say about her deliberative processes-and so it keeps those facts undervalued
because they stay unknown. Our legal system may find legitimacy in this self-
created ignorance. 29 And courts may cover their ears because they quietly
292. See id. (recalling the work of Hyman and Sheatsley, Sears and Freedman, and others).
293. See Bates, supra note 3 1, at 5.
294. See, e.g., City of Vincennes v. Marland Refining Co., 33 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1929)
("Unfortunately each side is prone to overestimate his or its 'rights' and to understate the strength of
the other's position."); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 30 (2009) ("[Those] who represented plaintiffs or defendants tended to overestimate the
strength of their case and to underestimate the strength of their opponents' case.").
295. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 151, at 1073, 1075 (labeling settlement a "capitulation" that
"should be neither encouraged nor praised").
296. See Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J.
352, 356 (1982).
297. See id; Brazil, supra note 6, at 1349; cf ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 457-60 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1965) (asking if different social experiences make
parties incapable of understanding each other).
298. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 579-80.
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suspect the worst-jurors who act on preconceptions, disregard instructions,• 299
and use deliberation time to snort cocaine. But Rule 606(b) makes use of
misestimation too: it encourages undervaluation by keeping information secret.
By sealing facts inside the black box, that is, Rule 606(b) makes it easier to
believe that those facts are insignificant-and so courts' ears are that much
easier to close.
Spoliation and work product doctrine may seem to do the opposite. They
may seem to flip the unknown-is-undervalued trend over, giving opponent-held
information a kind of inflated allure. The careful attorney may overinvest in
uncovering her adversary's facts, for example, not because those facts are
absolutely critical, but because to her they are mysterious. But if legal
information seekers act like occasional minefield anomalies, legal information
holders are more conventional minefield stock: they tend to believe that they
hold the most valuable information, and so they go to great lengths to control it,
even when they are wrong. The corporation aims not just to keep its attorney's
advice confidential, for example, but to destroy pertinent documents. And the
law permits the first half of this: work product shields attorney strategy;
spoliation restricts only misestimation's more destructive turns.
The law also invites litigants to stack their juries. And here peremptory
challenges provide an obliging tool. 300 But strategic use of peremptories
remains at best imperfect, implicating misestimation as much as other
information rules. One kind of peremptory misestimation concerns attorney
capacity: lawyers may think they can determine who to strike and who to
empanel, but they often overestimate their diagnostic skill. Almost half of the
jurors challenged in one famous study would have helped, not hurt, the
striking-party's case. 30 1 A second misestimation involves juror rigidity:
attorneys may think they can prod and persuade jurors during trial, but they
often underestimate how hard jurors are to shake.30 2 Silver-tongued attorneys
will sometimes succeed in converting skeptical fact finders. And dogmatic
jurors may find, on occasion, that their opinions can be changed.30 3 But
peremptory challenges do less to allay misestimation than to exaggerate it.
They invite litigants to trade in overconfident guesses-and then lend court
sanction to their jury-stacking stabs.
304
299. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 (1987).
300. Cf Tracey Altman, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge
Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1986) (advocating affirmative peremptories).
301. Zeisel, supra note 111, at 1166 ("It turned out that about half of the jurors [that attorneys]
challenged would have helped them.").
302. See, e.g., Tormala & Petty, supra note 251, at 1298.
303. See Simon, supra note 18, at 544 (noting that "simple instruction[s]" can reduce juror
stubbornness "substantially").
304. See Zeisel, supra note 11, at 1166.
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These guesses have their critics. 30 5 And so too do the demands of
automatic disclosure, the terms of work product doctrine, and the tight comers
of the jury's black box. 30 6 What follows puts this criticism in relevant context.
It does not propose some fantastic project of legal renovation. Nor does it
apologize for our information status quo. It instead surveys what might follow
this initial IB-law engagement, asking where that engagement counsels caution
and where it sounds the call for change.
C. A Caution and a Call
Recall, for a moment, the workplace dispute outlined earlier. There, an
employee of a large corporation believed she had been fired, not for shoddy
performance, but for rejecting the coarse advances of her longtime boss. In the
legal drama that followed, the defendant-corporation considered destroying
unfavorable email; dutiful attorneys disclosed a range of client-friendly data;
and the corporation succeeded in striking almost every woman from the jury
pool. That jury then delivered a verdict for the defendant, though perhaps not
because of any shortcoming in the plaintiffs case: a loose-lipped juror came
forward after the verdict to report a key misunderstanding-but he arrived too
late to make much difference, for his account of muddled deliberations was by
then off-limits to federal courts.
Elements of this story may be troubling. Some may flinch at the
corporation's obvious cynicism, others at the juror's too-late admission, still
more at the court's after-verdict inattention. But most of this story is sadly
ordinary, which is precisely what it aims to be. The aggrieved employee's tale
aims to be illustrative, not by its excess of drama, but by its lack of it-and in
that way to raise real questions about the operation of real rules.
One of those questions concerns the state of current law. Recent calls for
reform touch every information rule I have considered: Some propose a
toughening of spoliation enforcement, 30 7 others a retreat from automatic
disclosure. 30 Some argue for an end to peremptory challenges 3° 9 and work
31031product doctrine, others for an opening of the jury's black box.3 1
At least two of these appeals seem especially persuasive-and one
oversold: putting teeth into spoliation enforcement seems wise as a matter of
adjudicative accuracy'and judicial integrity. 312 Bringing an end to peremptory
305. See, e.g., Hoffnan, supra note 14.
306. See, e.g., Thomburg, supra note 13.
307. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 38, at 806 ("Existing rules are more than adequate ...
But... judges are extremely reluctant... to punish discovery violations once exposed.").
308. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 62.
309. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 14.
310. Thornburg, supra note 13.
311. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 221-26.
312. By putting teeth into spoliation enforcement, I mean something different than encouraging
courts to draw more adverse inferences. Adverse inferences may weigh heavy in the minds of some
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challenges seems right as a matter of civic misimpression and pessimistic
stereotypes. 3 13 And ending automatic disclosure seems wrong as a matter of
adversarial balance and litigation surprise.
3 14
But what makes these prescriptions valuable is not their allure in doctrinal
isolation. And what will render them unhelpful is to assume that they stand
alone. All of these changes can, and should, be understood within an
architectural context-as a part of a messy, elaborate, and interlocked system
of information rules. It is not just spoliation's peculiar lack of bite, for example,
that urges the rule's reinforcement. It is also the rule's role in offsetting our
system's postverdict silence, its part in achieving some equality among
adversaries, and its value in screening out the ugly effects of invalid
misinformation. It is not just the dubious mechanics of peremptory challenges,
in turn, that advise their abolition. It is also peremptories' trade in invalid
misinformation, their appeal to litigants' baser information instincts, and their
(apparent) non-contribution to our network of information rules. And it is not
just automatic disclosure's proaccuracy posture that favors its retention. It is
also the doctrine's counterpoint to unchecked adversarialism, its pushback
against litigants' self-serving impulses, and its front-end counterbalancing of
our system's back-end secrets.
Something outside the law can, and should, be considered here too. All of
these changes should be assessed, that is, against the helpful lessons of LB.
Spoliation bars should be fortified, for example, not simply because they help
preserve pertinent evidence, but because they restrain parties' least effort
tendencies and restrict their destructive misestimations. Peremptory challenges
jurors, and some courts may believe them to be particularly harmful. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("In practice, an adverse inference instruction...
is too difficult a hurdle for the spoliator to overcome."); see also Richard D. Friedman, Dealing with
Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1964 (1997) ("[M]issing evidence inference is
extremely useful and powerful. Its strength lies in large part in its informality .... "). But given what
the spoliator is likely to be hiding, an adverse inference may not seem like much of a sanction at all. To
borrow Professor Sanchirico's helpful summary, "A negative inference from spoliation seems no
worse than the negative inference that the evidence would have inspired had it not been destroyed."
Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1277 (citation omitted). Effective spoliation enforcement may thus
require more than that-at least to dissuade the proverbial "Bad Man." See Chris William Sanchirico,
Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1337 (2006) ("Sanctioning a given species of violation
not only discourages that violation, it also encourages those who still commit the violation to expend
additional resources avoiding detection. The greater the penalty, that is, the more imperative the cover-
up.") Still, it would not require the creation of an entirely new set of tools. Courts have sufficient tools
already. See Nesson, supra note 38, at 797.
313. See, e.g., Hoffrnan, supra note 14 (worrying that current peremptory practice leaves jurors
with a distorted and disappointing view of civil litigation). I do not mean to imply that this shift will be
invariably costless. For parties bearing the burden of proof, in fact, the loss of peremptory strikes may
prove particularly worrisome: one fluky or bitter juror, unhappy to be asked to serve, may grow to
resent the entire process-and to focus her ire on the party responsible for starting that process at all.
314. See, e.g., Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 737 (recalling the anti-surprise impetus of
modem discovery rles). But see Huang, supra note 70, at 208 (arguing that automatic disclosure does
little, if any, work).
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should be abandoned because they cloak threatening knowledge too easily and
endorse rank misestimations of lawyerly skill. And automatic disclosure should
be defended because it steers our least effort instincts in useful directions and
sets litigants' self-serving misestimations against themselves.
My aim, to be clear, is not to set out a formula for informational paralysis.
I do not mean to tie up every proposal for change in endless questions about
rule-interactivity and IB theory. My aim is instead to refine our analytical
lenses, to recall overlooked doctrinal interactions, to resist the allure of myopic
tinkering, and to rethink the tally of victories and failures at the heart of our
system of information rules.
That system may be doomed to untidy imperfection. Litigation's central
players will remain prone to IB errors. Cases will still turn on things other than
valid information. Parties, jurors, and attorneys will still occupy conflicted
legal roles. But our information rules, as a group, do some things well already:
they strike a balance between accuracy and adversarialism; they provide an
important dose of procedural equality; they acknowledge core notions of
human information behavior; and they address many of those notions
effectively too. The caution, then, is to proceed carefully in the quest to
improve our information system. And the call is to ask, critically and
comprehensively, how it may do better still.
CONCLUSION
Edson Sunderland may have been the first modern champion of American
civil information. A lawyer by training and a reformer by trade, Sunderland
was assigned, in 1935, the task of drafting the discovery provisions of the
original version of civil procedure's Federal Rules. 315  The scope of
Sunderland's survey was expansive, and the breadth of his study shaped his
project's result: Sunderland's "initial draft included every type of discovery
[device] that was known in the United States and probably England up to that
time.
, 316
Not everything on that initial list took hold immediately. Sunderland's
version of mandatory civil disclosure, for example, would not enter federal
317courts until 1993. But if some of Sunderland's proposals gained acceptance
only recently, nearly all seem quite likely to endure. Sunderland's roster of
rules is now "familiar to [every] American litigator." 318 It guides civil litigation
315. Subrin, supra note 59, at 718.
316. Id.; see also id at 702 (discussing the influence of George Ragland's Discovery Before
Trial on Sunderland and Charles Clark); Charles E. Clark, Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE. L.J. 988
(1933) (book review) ("Under modem practice ... [discovery] should be freely available....").
317. See Summary of Proceedings of the First Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules,
Held in the Federal Building of Chicago (June 20, 1935), in JUD. CoNF. U.S., RECORDS OF THE U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, at CI-
804-22 (Cong. Informational Service 1991) (discussing the tentative draft of Rule 57(a)).
318. Subrin, supra note 59, at 718.
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in federal and many state jurisdictions. And it has survived, mostly unaltered,
from its very start.
319
Top scholars have read this endurance to require a kind of critical
vigilance. They have looked at the various components of our information
system, studied its pieces as stand-alone entities, and offered thoughtful
suggestions for sometimes sizable change. 320 But the story of Edson
Sunderland offers more than a starting point for would-be rule reformers. And
it recalls more than a familiar catalog of fragmented discovery tools.
Sunderland's story tells of an inclusive legal attitude. It urges resistance to
doctrinal isolationism. And it invites integrated evaluation of our system of
information rules.
This Article has accepted that invitation. It has suggested two crucial but
largely unchronicled ways to expand our information outlook-one that tracks
the tradeoffs and tensions built into our information system, another that
establishes an early but enlightening link between the law and lB. Each way
offers something useful without the other: rule interaction highlights the
bargains and balances struck by seemingly unrelated doctrines; IB offers
theories like the principle of least effort, the threatening nature of knowledge,
and the minefield of misestimation. But rule interaction and IB do more still
when put together: They show, for one, how our system of information
antagonism-and not simply its pieces-anchors and accommodates the
actions of those inside it. And they filter our system's deepest commitments,
not merely through a frame of (in)valid (mis)information, but through a screen
of human information conduct.
In many ways, then, this Article is broad in its scope and ambition. It
argues for a different way to understand how our information system now
works. But this Article's focus is also deliberately narrow. It does not attempt
to consider every conceivable information doctrine, opting instead to present an
illustrative handful. Nor does it try to recount every possible IB lesson,
choosing instead to outline an essential few. More work should be done, then,
on the influence of other doctrinal pieces-the lasting vitality of
communication-hiding privileges, the public policy behind settlement-related
silence, 32 1 and the asymmetrical incentives of Miranda 22 and Brady.323 And
more should be learned too from IB-about how information might shape the
law's "communities of practice ' 324 and the ways behavior might change in
response to clients' "imposed queries."
325
319. See id.
320. See supra notes 303-306 and accompanying text.
321. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
322. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
323. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
324. Elisabeth Davies, Communities of Practice, in THEORIES, supra note 17, at 104.
325. Melissa Gross, The Imposed Query, in THEORIES, supra note 17, at 164-65.
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But if this Article aims in part to be a beginning, it also serves multiple
ends. It studies five information rules-spoliation, automatic disclosure, work
product doctrine, peremptory challenges, and juror testimony-with an eye
toward how those rules work together and apart. It explores too-long unstudied
doctrinal connections-like the link between automatic disclosure and Rule
606(b)-and then maps those connections along the values of accuracy,
adversarialism, and equality. It fits old information rules into a novel typology,
forging new and helpful distinctions among types of (in)valid (mis)information.
And it unlocks a fresh source of information insight, introducing IB as a way to
sound both a pessimistic caution and an optimistic call.
Those signs may leave some wanting. They may ring too timid and too
limited against a whirl of such awkward compromise-a corporation made
responsible for preserving evidence of its own wrongdoing, a careful attorney
cast as victory-chasing partisan and truth-promoting neutral, a loose-lipped
juror given ultimate decision-making power and then, soon after, ignored in
court. But these compromises may reflect something more than legal accident
or historical blunder. And the best response may involve something other than
quick amendment of individual rules.
Some amendments may still be worth making. Spoliation doctrine, for
example, seems to demand more vigorous enforcement. And peremptory
challenges may have reached their long-anticipated end. But neither change
can, or should, be seen in doctrinal isolation. And neither change can, or
should, be made without a careful consideration of the ideas this Article brings
into view-the rule-interactive overlaps built into our information system, and
the lessons IB teaches about the ways information is sought and silenced, used
and abused.
The issues here are pressing, the stakes of our choices high. Our civil
process serves an indispensable function, finding solutions for disputes that
might not otherwise be solved. We may choose to change that process
piecemeal or to reform it by grand gesture. We may tinker at the margins or
build new archetypes-and we have done both before. 326 But whatever we do
our choice will be significant. For information more than matters: it defines
litigation and determines outcomes.
In many American courtrooms stands a figure of Lady Justice. With a
scale in one hand and a sword in the other, this figure waits ready to decide and
to discipline-to weigh the merits of our cases and to impose fair punishment.
But Lady Justice also wears a blindfold. She may consider some information,
326. Compare the recent restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Levi, supra note
36, with the dramatic reshaping of civil litigation that the rules first occasioned almost seventy years
ago, see Subrin, supra note 59, at 691 ("The Federal Rules discovery provisions dramatically increased
the potential for discovery .... ); see also Kang, Cyber-Race, supra note 23, at 1136 ("The choice-
of what we would like to achieve and how-is up to us."); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 19, at 737
("[C]ivil procedure has gone into hypertrophy. The subject of multiple waves of change ... ").
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but must stay ignorant of some too. Even now we may read this blindfold as
something hopeful, even poetic-a sign that the law is unconcerned with what
litigants look like and who the parties are. But we should also read this
blindfold for something more prosaic, concrete, even information-bound. Real
Justice depends on what it sees and what it misses.327 It depends on
information lost and found.
327. D. GRAHAMBURNET, ATRiALBYJURY 80(2001).
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